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Editors’ Synopsis: With the number of Americans capable of leaving
their children large inheritances increasing, some parents are con-
cerned that their children may have too much and may wish to leave
money to their children with strings attached. One vehicle available to
these parents is the incentive trust, which imposes fixed conditions on
distributions to encourage certain beneficiary behavior and leaves little
or no discretion to the trustee to determine whether the settlor would
have approved of the beneficiary’s actions. However, an incentive trust
that provides little or no discretion to the trustee may prove to be inflex-
ible and a burden to the beneficiaries. This Article examines whether the
current trend toward trust modification reform takes into account the
particular difficulties posed by incentive trusts and  how the ability to
modify a trust could affect the incentive trust’s inflexibility problem.
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1 Of course, the avoidance of transfer taxes is also a primary goal of estate planning.
See David Joulfaian, Gift Taxes and Lifetime Transfers: Time Series Evidence, 88 J. PUB.
ECON. 1917, 1927 (2004). The purpose of avoiding such taxes, however, often may be to
secure a larger inheritance for the decedent’s intended beneficiaries. The two goals are
therefore compatible.
2 ANDREW CARNEGIE, The Advantages of Poverty, in THE GOSPEL OF WEALTH AND
OTHER TIMELY ESSAYS 50 (Edward C. Kirkland ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1962).
3 Id. at 56.
4 See Survey: Number of Millionaires Hits Record,  http://money.cnn.com/2005/09/
28/news/economy/millionaire_survey/index.htm?cnn=yes (quoting a survey by market
information company TNS) (last visited Aug. 29, 2006); Record High Number of
Millionaires, http://money.cnn.com/2004/11/16/pf/millionaire_households/index.htm?.
cnn=yes (same) (last visited Aug. 29, 2006). A similar trend is happening worldwide. See
High Net Worth Wealth Grows Strongly at Over 8%, http://www.us.capgemini.com/news/
current_news.asp?ID=489&PRyear=2005 (stating that the wealth of high-net-worth
individuals grew by 8.2% in 2004) (last visited Sept. 9, 2006).
5 See DINESH D’SOUZA, THE VIRTUE OF PROSPERITY: FINDING VALUES IN AN AGE OF
I. INTRODUCTION
Many generations of Americans have used trusts to ensure that their
descendants can live a comfortable lifestyle. By providing a steady source
of income, a trust can prevent one’s children or grandchildren from facing
financial distress due to economic calamity or personal misfortune. No
parent wants a child to starve, and the desire to provide for one’s surviv-
ing family after death long has been—and still is—the main impetus for
estate planning.1 Recently, however, more and more Americans have
begun to fear something other than the prospect that their children will not
have enough: the possibility that they will have too much. This fear has
significant consequences for American trust law.
The notion that inheriting too much wealth can be bad for a child is
not new. In an 1891 essay entitled The Advantages of Poverty,2 Andrew
Carnegie wrote that “the parent who leaves his son enormous wealth
generally deadens the talents and energies of the son, and tempts him to
lead a less useful and less worthy life than he otherwise would.”3 In recent
years, however, the number of Americans capable of leaving “enormous
wealth” to their children, or something close to it, has grown consider-
ably. A 2005 survey found that there are a record 8.9 million U.S.
households with a net worth over $1 million, an 8% increase over the
same figures for 2004, which were in turn a 33% increase over the figures
from 2003.4 Multimillionaires are also increasingly common. From 1980
to 2000, the number of Americans whose annual income exceeded $1
million increased  more than tenfold, and there were over twenty times as
many American billionaires in 2000 as there were in 1982.5 Some of this
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TECHNO-AFFLUENCE 13–15 (2000) (citing data from Forbes magazine and the Internal
Revenue Service).
6 U.S. TRUST SURVEY OF AFFLUENT AMERICANS XIX, at 3 (Dec. 2000). The U.S.
Trust Survey has been cited in the Journal before. See Joel C. Dobris, Why Five? The
Strange, Magnetic, and Mesmerizing Affect of the Five Percent Unitrust and Spending
Rate on Settlors, Their Advisors, and Retirees, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 39, 60 n.88
(2005). It is generally regarded as an unbiased barometer of the opinions of wealthy
individuals in the United States.
7 U.S. TRUST SURVEY OF AFFLUENT AMERICANS XIX, at 3.
8 See Dana Wechsler Linden & Dyan Machan, The Disinheritors, FORBES, May 19,
1997, at 152–60.
9 See Karen Richardson, Warren Buffett Gives $30 Billion to Gates Foundation,
WALL ST. J., June 26, 2006, at B1.
10 Richard I. Kirkland Jr., Should You Leave It All to the Children?, FORTUNE, Sept.
29, 1986, at 18 (quoting Warren Buffett).
is due to inflation, but the fact is that being rich is less unusual today than
it has been in the past.
By sheer force of numbers, today’s millionaires are likely to have a
broader impact on estate planning practice than their predecessors. It is
therefore significant that the new millionaires seem to be worried about
the ability of their children to handle money. A 2000 survey of the
wealthiest Americans (defined as the top 10% by wealth or income) who
have children revealed that more than half of these affluent parents are
concerned that their children “will place too much emphasis on material
possessions,” “will be naïve about the value of money and how hard it is
to earn,” and “will spend beyond their means.”6 Almost half worry that
their children “will have their initiative and independence undermined by
having material advantages.”7 Parents with these concerns are likely to
have reservations about leaving large amounts of money to their children.
In 1997, reporters from Forbes magazine interviewed a number of
multimillionaire entrepreneurs and found that some of them planned to
leave most of their wealth to charity on the theory that too much inherited
money would be bad for their children.8 Billionaire Warren Buffett, who
has recently announced plans to give the bulk of his vast fortune to the
charitable Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation,9 was famously quoted in
Fortune magazine as saying that “the perfect amount to leave to [one’s]
children is ‘enough money so that they would feel they could do anything,
but not so much that they could do nothing.’”10 This sentiment may be
particularly common among those who earned their fortune through hard
work and did not inherit it themselves.
Leaving most of one’s fortune to charity is one solution to the prob-
lem of protecting one’s children from the perils of wealth, but some
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11 A trust “is a fiduciary relationship with respect to property, arising from a
manifestation of intention to create that relationship and subjecting the person who holds
title to the property to duties to deal with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more
persons, at least one of whom is not the sole trustee.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS
§ 2 (2003). The person creating the trust is called the settlor; the person who holds
property in trust is the trustee; and a person for whose benefit property is held in trust is a
beneficiary. See id. § 3; see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES
485, 489 (7th ed. 2005).
12 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 11, at 533 (explaining the nature of
discretionary trusts).
13 See, e.g., LAWRENCE W. WAGGONER ET AL., FAMILY PROPERTY LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS ON WILLS, TRUSTS, AND FUTURE INTERESTS 709–37 (David L. Shapiro et al.
eds., The Foundation Press Inc. 1991) (discussing “so-called incentive trusts” in the
context of trust modification and termination).
14 See, e.g., Catherine M. Allchin, In Some Trusts, the Heirs Must Work for the
Money, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2006, § 3, at 6; Peter S. Green, Planning an Estate to
Preserve a Family, INT’L HERALD TRIBUNE, Oct. 27, 2004, at 20; Mary Hickok, Family
Incentive Trusts Pass Along Values Too, NAT’L LAW JOURNAL, Mar. 1, 2004, at 16;
wealthy individuals may prefer to leave their money to their children with
some strings attached. By using a trust, it is possible to limit distributions
to one’s children in such a way as to encourage positive behavior.11 A
traditional vehicle for doing this is the discretionary trust, in which the
trustee is given the authority to decide how the money will be spread
among the beneficiaries.12 Under a discretionary trust, the trustee may
reward beneficiaries whose conduct, in the view of the trustee, would
have met with the settlor’s approval. Recently, however, some estate
planners have begun to promote trusts that attach fixed conditions on
distributions, conditions that leave less discretion to the trustee. Condi-
tions might include provisions requiring the beneficiaries to graduate
from college, achieve a certain grade point average, or earn a certain
amount of income in order to qualify for distributions from the trust. A
trust that imposes such fixed conditions is generally referred to as an
“incentive trust,” although the term also may be applied to more tradi-
tional discretionary trusts. The term incentive trust was originally created
for marketing purposes by estate planners, but it is beginning to work its
way into the academic literature.13
Because the terms of inter vivos trusts are not publicly reported, it is
not possible to know with certainty how many of the trusts being created
today are drafted as incentive trusts. Anecdotal evidence, however, sug-
gests that incentive trusts are increasing in popularity, although they
remain the exception rather than the norm. Articles in periodicals such as
the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal have suggested that it has
become fashionable in some circles to draft incentive trusts.14 According
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Monica Langley, Trust Me, Baby: The House, the Money—It’ll All Be Yours; There’s Just
One Thing—Rich Parents Find New Way to Keep Tabs on Heirs: “Family Incentive
Plans,” WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1999, at A1; Pamela Yip, Attaching Strings: Children Now
Inheriting Rules Along with Money, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Sept. 13, 1999, at 1D; J.
Peder Zane, The Rise of Incentive Trusts; Six Feet Under and Overbearing, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 12, 1995, § 4, at 5.
15 Allchin, supra note 14, § 3, at 6 (quoting George S. Holzapfel, an estate planning
lawyer at a Seattle firm). Holzapfel reports that “[a]mong his clients with young children
and assets of $10 million or more, about 60 percent have incentive trusts.” Id.
16 See J. Alex Tarquinio, An Estate Plan Worthy of Scrooge, FORBES, Dec. 25, 1999,
http://www.forbes.com/1999/12/25/feat.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006); see also
Langley, supra note 14.
17 See Joel C. Dobris, The Death of the Rule Against Perpetuities, or the RAP Has No
Friends—An Essay, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 601, 651–52 (2000) (discussing the
“productization” of trusts generally).
18 See, e.g., Shapira v. Union Nat’l Bank, 315 N.E.2d 825 (Ohio C.P. 1974) (holding
that the condition precedent to the bequest was a reasonable restriction, and containing
further citations to cases regarding conditional gifts).
to the New York Times, one estate planner in Seattle, “who has many
wealthy clients in the technology and real estate fields, . . . has seen a
growing interest in performance-based trusts.”15 A financial-services
publisher that, in 1999, started selling a “family incentive trust” plan
created by an Atlanta attorney—complete with audio tapes, a CD-ROM,
and a forty-two-page outline for a trust—sold 450 copies of the package
in the first five months, mostly to financial planners.16 Some of these
financial planners no doubt are pitching incentive trusts to their clients,
and some of those clients may be listening.17
Conditional gifts are not a new phenomenon.18 Parents long have
sought to influence the behavior of their children through financial re-
wards, both before and after death. What is new about contemporary
incentive trusts is that the institution of the trust is now being employed to
carry out what was accomplished formerly through simple conditional
bequests. Using the trust form brings new problems that older conditional
gifts did not pose.
When an incentive trust is drafted to leave little discretion to the
trustee, the possibility emerges that the trust will prove to be inflexible. A
provision requiring a beneficiary to graduate from college in order to
receive trust funds may create difficulties when the beneficiary has a
serious medical problem that prevents her from attending school. A trust
that awards a dollar of trust income for every dollar that the beneficiary
earns on his own can discourage the beneficiary from entering a socially
beneficial but less remunerative profession, such as teaching. Some
settlors will anticipate these problems, but others may not. Incentive trusts
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19 See Claflin v. Claflin, 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TRUSTS § 337 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 cmt. b (stating
that a court will not permit deviation from the terms of the trust merely because it is
advantageous to the beneficiaries).
20 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (2003).
21 See CAL. PROBATE CODE § 15403(b) (West 1991).
22 See infra Part III.B.
23 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 412, 7c U.L.A. 293 (Supp. 2006) (allowing modification
of administrative or dispositive terms of a trust “if, because of circumstances not
anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination will further the purposes of the
trust”); see also id. § 105(b)(4) (explaining the mandatory nature of this rule).
24 See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Default Rules in Inheritance Law: A Problem in Search
of Its Context, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2004); John H. Langbein, Mandatory
Rules in the Law of Trusts, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2004).
pose this inflexibility problem: because the settlor cannot foresee all
potential eventualities or circumstances and take them into account in the
trust, the terms of the trust can prove to be a burden for the beneficiaries.
A reasonable settlor, it might be argued, would draft the trust so as to take
into account the possibility of changed circumstances, giving the trustee,
the beneficiaries, or both a mechanism to change the trust. An unreason-
able or poorly advised settlor, however, may not take this approach. In the
latter case, the question will arise whether a court should be able to ap-
prove a petition to modify the trust.
The traditional American rule is that a court cannot order a modifica-
tion (or termination) of a trust after the settlor’s death when doing so
contravenes a material purpose of the settlor.19 In recent years, however,
law reformers have been pushing for changes that will make it easier to
modify or terminate inflexible trusts after the death of the settlor. This
trend is particularly noticeable in the Restatement (Third) of Trusts, which
allows a court to balance the settlor’s purposes against the reasons for
modification or termination offered by the beneficiaries.20 The Third
Restatement approach, which follows the lead of an innovative provision
in the California Probate Code,21 would limit the inflexibility problem
associated with incentive trusts. It also would give broad power to courts
to disregard the settlor’s wishes and side with the beneficiaries.
The Third Restatement approach appears to be mandatory law, al-
though its drafters do not state that explicitly.22 The Uniform Trust Code
(UTC), which also gives somewhat greater modification powers to courts
compared with the traditional approach (but does not go as far as the
Third Restatement), makes its modification provisions mandatory law.23
Mandatory rules, as contrasted with default rules, cannot be altered by the
settlor.24 This means that a settlor who does not wish to have the trust
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25 See Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1313–14 (2003); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach,
Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and
Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005); Joshua C. Tate, Perpetual Trusts and the Settlor’s
Intent, 53 U. KAN. L. REV. 595, 595–96, 603–05 (2005).
26 See, e.g., Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st
Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR.
J. 697, 729 (2001) (“[I]t is clear that reformers realize that modification and termination
by beneficiaries must be made easier.”); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 25, at 1329
(“We have to discard the nineteenth-century idea . . . that trusts are written in stone by an
omniscient settlor.”)
27 See Tate, supra note 25, at 623; but see, e.g., Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 25,
at 1327–39 (discussing problems that may arise when a trust is too inflexible).
modified by a court under any circumstances may be frustrated under the
UTC or Third Restatement approaches. Whether this is a desirable result
is open to debate.
Incentive trusts may present a challenge to American trust law for
many years to come, even if they prove to be a passing fad, because it is
now possible to create perpetual “dynasty trusts” in many states. These
trusts have the potential to last forever but need not be limited to charita-
ble purposes.25 If a perpetual dynasty trust is drafted as an incentive trust,
the conditions imposed by the settlor can continue to bind descendants as
long as the trust remains in existence. This means that courts in a hundred
years well may be hearing modification petitions by beneficiaries of a
perpetual incentive trust created today. Incentive trusts are not likely to
vanish from the scene in the foreseeable future, and policymakers must
come to terms with their ramifications.
This Article questions whether the current trend toward trust modifi-
cation reform adequately takes into account the particular difficulties
posed by contemporary incentive trusts. Scholars who have examined
recent reforms in the area of trust modification generally have assumed
that allowing greater latitude to courts is a positive development, espe-
cially given the rise of perpetual dynasty trusts.26 In the case of an incen-
tive trust, however, mandatory modification rules may enable the benefi-
ciaries to undo the scheme created by the settlor and remove conditions
that encourage certain types of positive behavior. One might argue that
some of the conditions imposed by settlors are actually good for the
beneficiaries and that the ability of courts to tinker with the provisions of
an incentive trust should be limited. A valid case can be made in support
of the dead hand.27 Nonetheless, sound arguments also exist for allowing
the courts to step in when the terms of the trust are more of a hindrance
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28 See Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 25, at 359.
than a benefit to the beneficiaries. The inflexibility problem posed by
incentive trusts is not easy to resolve.
This Article is divided into six parts. Part II discusses the phenome-
non of the incentive trust, using promotional websites and articles in
newspapers and professional journals as evidence for how such a trust
might be structured, what sort of conditions it might impose on access to
trust funds, and how those conditions might pose a problem of inflexibil-
ity. Part III then discusses the traditional common law approach toward
trust modification and recent proposals to give greater latitude to courts.
Examining the policy rationales for and against dead hand control, Part IV
considers the problems that might arise when courts are allowed to mod-
ify a trust against the settlor’s wishes. Based on this analysis, Part V
suggests some possible alternatives to current reform
proposals–alternatives that take into account the special difficulties asso-
ciated with incentive trusts. Part VI concludes.
II. THE CONTEMPORARY INCENTIVE TRUST
Gathering empirical data on the special characteristics of incentive
trusts is difficult. Although it is possible to get a sense of how many trusts
are being created in the various states by looking at reports to federal
banking authorities,28 these reports do not distinguish between incentive
trusts and other types of trusts. Making the terms of an inter vivos trust
public is not required, and many settlors have good reasons for keeping
their wishes private. Relying on those settlors who are willing to talk may
result in a skewed sample.
Despite these difficulties, it is possible to get a general idea of what a
contemporary incentive trust might look like. Several estate planning
attorneys have written articles in professional journals and other periodi-
cals explaining what might be accomplished with an incentive trust. Other
estate planners, along with some financial institutions, have created
promotional websites telling prospective and current clients how they
might accomplish their goals with an incentive trust. A few newspapers
have interviewed wealthy individuals about the incentive trusts they have
created. These sources describe different conditions on access to funds
that an incentive trust might include and discuss other important matters,
such as the selection of the trustee and planning for changed circum-
stances. At least some individuals probably are following the suggestions
made in the promotional websites and articles. Such sources, therefore,
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29 Examples of conditions that violate public policy might include conditions
encouraging criminal or tortious conduct, or conditions that interfere with family
relationships or religious freedom. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmts.
i-m (2003).
30 See, e.g., Hickok, supra note 14, at 16 (explaining that a trust might schedule a
distribution “when a young heir . . . obtains a degree”); Langley, supra note 14, at A1
(discussing a trust that provides “$5,000 for each degree obtained”); Richard W. Ashley,
Family Incentive Trusts Help Children Set Goals,  http://www.ohiobar.org/pub/lycu/index.
asp?articleid=372 (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (explaining that a trust “can reward children
with distributions upon achieving certain goals, such as . . . earning a college degree”);
The Bank of New York, Intergenerational Transfer of Wealth—and Values—with a
Family Incentive Trust, http://web.archive.org (search “http://www.bankofny.com/pbnl/
spring00/pbnl/page2.html”; click on most recent date hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 5, 2006)
(suggesting an “incentive for those who graduate from college”); Gary W. Buffone, The
Psychology of Inheritance: Securing Your Legacy, http://www.grandtimes.com/articles/
The_Psychology.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (“[C]hildren may receive a specified
amount of money when they graduate from college . . . .”); City National Bank, Incentive
Trusts: A Chance to Have It Your Way, http://www.cityntl.com/wms/insights/incentive-
trusts.asp (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (suggesting that a trust “can be directed to give a
beneficiary: $25,000 upon graduation from college”); Clark Hill PLC, Use Incentive
Trusts To Reinforce Values, INSIGHT ON EST. PLAN., available at
http://www.clarkhill.com/LAW_MEDIA/IEP2002-06.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2006)
(“Charlie, a 20-year-old college dropout, learns that his Uncle Ed has provided him with
$500,000 in trust. But Charlie can withdraw the trust funds only if he returns to college
offer some anecdotal evidence about the likely characteristics of contem-
porary incentive trusts.
A. Conditions Imposed by Incentive Trusts
The conditions that incentive trusts might impose can be divided into
three broad categories. First are conditions that encourage the
beneficiaries to pursue an education. Second are conditions that provide
what might be termed moral incentives: incentives that reflect the settlor’s
moral or religious outlook or promote a particular way of living. Some of
these conditions try to encourage the beneficiaries to contribute to
charitable causes, while others discourage substance abuse or promote a
traditional family lifestyle. Finally, there are conditions designed to
encourage the beneficiaries to have a productive career. Within these
broad categories are a variety of different incentives that can be tailored to
the specific wishes of a particular settlor. Provided that these incentives
do not violate public policy, courts generally will enforce them.29
Judging by the websites and articles that discuss incentive trusts,
conditions relating to education are popular among settlors. The most
common provision mentioned awards some amount of the trust income or
principal to a beneficiary upon graduation from college.30 An incentive
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and earns a bachelor’s degree.”); The Glenview Trust Company, “Values-Based” Estate
Planning, http://www.glenviewtrust.com/topics/WealthTransfer/Values based estate
plans.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (stating that “payments of income or principal . . .
may be tied to an educational objective” such as “completion of college”); KDV, Stop
Your Late Night Worries, TAX IMPACT, http://web.archive.org (search
“http://www.kdv.com/tax/pdf/TAXmj01.pdf”; click on most recent date hyperlink) (last
visited Oct. 5, 2006) (describing a “[r]eward trust” as a trust that “rewards beneficiaries
for meeting goals such as completing . . . college”); Merrill Lynch, Inheriting More than
Wealth, http://askmerrill.ml.com/publish/marketing_centers/articles/eps_article_EP028/
(last visited Sept. 11,  2006) (discussing incentives for “educational milestones, such as
graduating from college”); Rachel Sams, Some Trusts Coming with Strings Attached,
C I N C I N N A T I  B U S .  C O U R I E R ,  A p r .  2 3 ,  2 0 0 4 ,  a v a i l a b l e  a t
http://www.bizjournals.com/cincinnati/stories/2004/04/26/focus3.html?t=printable (last
visited Sept. 11, 2006) (“With family incentive trusts, heirs must meet certain
requirements in order to receive trust money—for example, graduate from college . . . .”);
Thane Stenner, Inheritance Without the Headache: Incentive Trusts Can Help Parents
Pass on Wealth to Children, http://www.truewealth.ca/IMAGES/inheritance.pdf (last
visited Sept. 11, 2006) (explaining that a trust “might distribute money on the
accomplishment of important life goals: graduating from university, for example”);
Tarquinio, supra note 16 (discussing a trust created by Atlanta businessman Ted Levy that
includes “cutting . . . a $5000 check for college graduation”); Terry Balding & Associates,
Incentive Trust, http://www.plannr.com/pdf/IncentiveTrust.PDF (last visited Sept. 11,
2006) (“An incentive trust might pay income or principal, or perhaps pay a larger amount
or pay it sooner, if the beneficiary graduates from college . . . .”); Wells Marble &
Hurst, Incentive Trusts: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (and Gone?),
http://www.wellsmar.com/CM/NewsandArticles/NewsandArticles42.asp (last visited
Sept. 11, 2006) (providing an example of a provision that allows the trustees to distribute
up to $25,000 upon graduation from college).
31 See, e.g., The Bank of New York, supra note 30 (stating that the settlor “might
arrange for the trust to pay a certain amount to each family member who graduates from
high school”); KDV, supra note 30 (trust can reward beneficiaries for “completing high
school”).
32 See, e.g., John J. Scroggin, Family Incentive Trusts, J. FIN. SERV. PROF’LS, July
2000, at 74, 87 (describing a sample provision that provides $20,000 under certain
conditions when a beneficiary obtains a first graduate degree); The Bank of New York,
supra note 30 (trust can provide funds for beneficiaries who “obtain graduate degrees”);
Buffone, supra note 30 (describing trusts that provide money to the beneficiaries when
they “earn a graduate degree”); The Glenview Trust Company, supra note 30 (noting that
distributions can be “tied to an educational objective” such as “completion of . . . graduate
school”); Merrill Lynch, supra note 30 (explaining that “earning an advanced degree” can
be a condition of receiving trust distributions); Wells Marble & Hurst, supra note 30
(offering a sample provision that pays a beneficiary $35,000 upon the receipt of a first
advanced degree); Liz Pulliam Weston, Making Heirs Work for Their Wealth, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, http://www.latimes.com/business/investing/la-famtalk-story4,1,5423811.
story (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (describing a trust created by businessman Marty
Holmes that offers “extra payments for graduate school”).
trust might also provide funds when a beneficiary graduates from high
school31 or completes a graduate degree.32 These distributions might be
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33 See, e.g., Scroggin, supra note 32, at 87 (providing sample incentives tying
distributions to graduation from high school or graduate school with specified GPA).;
William J. Berrall, Trust Funds, http://www.parentstalk.com/expertsadvice/ea_fp_0007.
html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (“[A]n incentive trust may require that the trust’s
beneficiary receive funds only after graduating from college with a certain grade point
average.”).
34 See, e.g., Scroggin, supra note 32, at 87 (suggesting a provision that provides
“$5,000 per year to any descendant who is attending college on a full-time basis [a]nd
maintains at least a 2.8 grade point average”); Ashley, supra note 30 (noting trust
distributions for “keeping a certain grade point average in school”); David Bell, Do
Clients Have the Incentive To Use Incentive Trusts?, http://www.cannonfinancial.com/
cgi-bin/newsDetail.cfm?ID=100 (last visited Aug. 29, 2006) (offering a sample provision
stating that “[t]he trustee shall distribute trust principal to or for Son for his education
during high school and post-secondary school, if and so long as Son maintains a
cumulative grade point average of at least ___ and carries at least ____ substantive credit
hours each semester”); Clark Hill PLC, supra note 30 (“Incentive provisions can make
distributions contingent on the beneficiary . . . achieving a certain grade point average . . . .”);
The Glenview Trust Company, supra note 30 (explaining that a trust could be tied to
“achieving a certain grade point average”); Duane Sharpe, Incentive Trust May Be Good
Choice, DAYTON BUS. J., Apr. 1, 2005, available at http://www.bizjournals.com/dayton/
stories/2005/04/04/newscolumn1.html: 
An incentive to pay a monthly stipend to a full-time college student
could lead to a never-ending career as a student. A more specific
incentive would be to pay a monthly amount based on full-time
attendance at an accredited institution, and maintaining a “B” average
grade while in pursuit of the first bachelor, first master and first
doctorate or medical degrees.
Tarquinio, supra note 16 (describing a trust that “cuts money off if an heir’s GPA dips
below 3.0”); Terry Balding & Associates, supra note 30 (stating that “[a]n incentive trust
might pay income or principal . . . if the beneficiary . . . maintains a certain grade point
average”); Weston, supra note 32 (describing a trust “that would reward good grades”).
35 See, e.g., Bob Saalfeld, “Kids, the Inheritance Is All Yours, but . . . ,” http://www.
sglaw.com/Article_EP_16.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (referring to experts who
suggest that a trust “[p]rovide for distributions so a child can complete college, vocational
or graduate school, but require a minimum grade point average, or even limit the number
of years to complete a degree”).
36 See, e.g., Zane, supra note 14 (explaining that some benefactors reward “heirs who
go to the same schools [or] study the same subjects . . . as they did”); Bell Capital
Management, Incentive Trusts: Keeping a Steady Hand on the Tiller, http://www.bellcapital.
com/pdf/q4_04.pdf (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (“Incentive trusts have been used to
made conditional on the beneficiary’s obtaining a specified grade point
average.33 Distributions may also be awarded while the beneficiary re-
mains in school, provided that a certain grade point average is main-
tained.34 The trust also might limit the number of years in which distribu-
tions are allowed.35 If the settlor is particularly enamored of a certain
educational institution, the trust could provide for distributions only if the
beneficiary enrolls at that school.36
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provide extra support to those heirs who . . . attend specified institutions.”); Clark Hill
PLC, supra note 30 (noting that incentives can “make distributions contingent on . . .
attending a particular school”).
37 See, e.g., Nancy G. Henderson, Managing the Benefits and Burdens of New Wealth
with Incentive Trusts (Part 2) (With Sample Provisions), PRAC. LAW., Oct. 2001, at 11, 12
(“A trust may be drafted to cut off benefits to a beneficiary who has substance abuse
problems, other than those benefits necessary to secure treatment and to insure that basic
living needs are met.”); David R. Hodgman & Debra L. Stetter, Can Incentive Trusts
Encourage Children to Behave Responsibly?, 27 EST. PLAN. 459, 459 (2000) (noting that
incentive provisions can “address specific behavioral problems (e.g., substance abuse)”);
Paul Arslanian, Estate Planning—Family Values and Security for Your Children,
http://www.estateplans.com/articles/article.html?id=17&pf=1 (last visited Sept. 11, 2006)
(suggesting that incentive trusts can involve “[w]ithholding of distributions based upon
undesirable behavior, including drug use, gambling or other addictions”); Bell, supra note
34 (explaining that the trust could “dissuade” the beneficiary from engaging in “drug
abuse, a gambling addiction, [or] alcohol abuse”); Bell Capital Management, supra note
36 (stating that some trusts withhold benefits for drug use); Berrall, supra note 33
(suggesting that the “trust could stipulate that no funds are to be paid from the trust if the
young person is involved in drugs”); City National Bank, supra note 30 (“A provision
seen often these days discourages illegal drug use . . . .”); Clark Hill PLC, supra note 30
(“Grantors commonly provide incentives for beneficiaries to stop smoking or drinking,
avoid drugs, lose weight, or refrain from various kinds of destructive . . . behavior.”); The
Glenview Trust Company, supra note 30 (“The trust even may forbid distributions in the
case of destructive behavior (for example, alcohol or substance abuse).”); George P.
Guertin, Inheritance Issues, http://web.archive.org (search  “http://www.attorneygeorgepguertin.
com/Resources/InheritanceIssues.htm”; click on most recent date hyperlink) (last visited Oct.
5, 2006) (explaining that an incentive trust can be drafted so as to discourage
“drug/alcohol abuse”); KDV, supra note 30 (noting that “some grantors have included
disincentives—preventing trust-asset allocations to beneficiaries who . . . [f]all prey to
substance abuse or other addictions”); The LeVan Company, Incentive Trusts,
http://www.levanco.com/readings/incentive_trusts.html (last visited Sept. 11, 2006)
(incentive trusts can “reward . . . the avoidance of alcohol or drugs”); Sharpe, supra note
34 (explaining that trusts can discourage “self-destructive behavior,” including “drug or
alcohol abuse”); Terry Balding & Associates, supra note 30 (“Some trusts won’t pay out
money unless the beneficiary stays free of drugs, alcohol or tobacco.”).
Encouraging education, therefore, is likely to be a central purpose of
many incentive trusts. However, it is far from being the only purpose.
Promotional materials often note that incentive trusts can promote a sober,
family-oriented lifestyle. For example, many websites and articles suggest
a provision restricting access to funds for beneficiaries who use or abuse
drugs, alcohol, or tobacco; overeat; or engage in other compulsive behav-
ior such as gambling.37 
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38 See, e.g., Bell Capital Management, supra note 36 (noting that the trust can
withhold benefits from heirs who “fail a prescribed drug screening test”); City National
Bank, supra note 30 (explaining that a provision can require “a ‘clean’ drug test before the
trustee makes distributions”); Personal Benefit Services of Colorado, For Parents Worried
About Creating a Trust Baby, a Tool: Incentive Trust Can Be a Clever Lever,
http://www.pbscolorado.com/financial_planning6.htm (last visited Sept. 11, 2006) (“For
children with a history of drug or alcohol abuse, the trust could reward sobriety, perhaps
requiring blood tests or counseling to qualify for distributions.”); Tarquinio, supra note 16
(noting that a popular incentive trust package “includes items to check if you’d like your
heirs to submit to regular drug tests”).
39 See, e.g., Langley, supra note 14, at A1  (discussing one client who instructed his
attorney “to include in his children’s trust a $10,000 payment for each year [the
beneficiaries] don’t have a driving violation”); Bell Capital Management, supra note 36
(suggesting that a trust could withhold benefits “from those heirs who might be convicted
of a crime”); Berrall, supra note 33 (noting that trusts may impose restrictions for drug
use or “other illegal activities”); KDV, supra note 30 (noting that a trust can withhold
benefits from beneficiaries who “[c]onsistently violate the law”).
40 See, e.g., Zane, supra note 14 (stating that some settlors attempt to “transform
playboys into homebodies by tying their inheritance to marriage”). Of course, such a
provision might backfire if it is not drafted carefully; one New York investment counselor
recalls an incident in which an heir “married 13 times” in order to receive multiple
payments of $250,000 conditioned on marriage. See id.; see also City National Bank,
supra note 30 (including a sample provision giving the beneficiary “$50,000 when getting
married”); Clark Hill PLC, supra note 30 (“Some grantors feel it’s important to reward
beneficiaries who wed and stay married.”); KDV, supra note 30 (describing trusts that
“match[] the beneficiary’s share . . . of costs for events such as weddings”); Tarquinio,
supra note 16 (discussing the trust of a businessman that provides “a $10,000 check for a
wedding”).
41 Wells Marble & Hurst, supra note 30.
42 See Langley, supra note 14, at A1 (discussing a trust that made “[g]reater
distributions . . . if the descendant is married to the person who is the mother of his
children and they’re living together in the same house”).
43 See Bell, supra note 34 (noting a sample provision awarding $10,000 if the
beneficiary marries “a woman of the Roman Catholic faith”).
The settlor might require drug testing or counseling as a condition of
receiving trust income.38 The trust might specify that other illegal activi-
ties warrant restrictions on distributions.39
In addition to discouraging substance abuse, settlors appear interested
in encouraging beneficiaries to marry and stay married. Websites and
articles mention provisions that distribute money when the beneficiary
marries.40 The distribution might be conditional on “waiting until a certain
age to marry” or marrying “the ‘right’ sort of person,”41 or staying mar-
ried to and living with the parent of one’s children.42 The settlor might
specify that the new spouse be of a particular faith43 or otherwise limit the
distribution based on the settlor’s preferences. One suggested provision
distributes “$10,000 upon the first marriage of each descendant of mine,
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44 Scroggin, supra note 32, at 87.
45 See Tarquinio, supra note 16 (“Marriage counselors across the land will no doubt
be glad to learn of the provision that penalizes heirs for divorcing.”).
46 See Hodgman & Stetter, supra note 37, at 444: 
The trustee shall make no distributions to a descendant of mine who is
living with a person other than that descendant’s spouse and with
whom that descendant has a conjugal relationship, as the trustee
determines in its sole and absolute discretion, for as long as the
descendant continues to live with that person and they remain
unmarried.
47 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 29 cmt. j (2003).
48 See Sams, supra note 30.
49 See, e.g., Hickok, supra note 14, at 17 (noting that “clients often want to include
provisions that cover a stay-at-home parent”); Langley, supra note 14, at A1 (discussing a
trust that offers “a possible monthly payment of as much as $10,000 if [the beneficiary] is
a stay-at-home mother”); Scroggin, supra note 32, at 87 (suggesting a provision paying
“$30,000 annually to any parent or guardian who stays home with a minor descendant of
mine”); Bell Capital Management, supra note 36 (“Some trusts are intended to promote
family life by providing income support payments to heirs who choose to stay at home
with children.”); Clark Hill PLC, supra note 30, at 3 (noting that some settlors “choose to
reward a spouse who stays home to take care of the family’s children”); Sharpe, supra
note 34 (suggesting an incentive promoting “marriage to a stay-at-home mom”);
Tarquinio, supra note 16 (reporting that one estate planner “claims that 60% to 70% of his
clients choose the provision to allow for additional payouts to a stay-at-home parent”);
Wells Marble & Hurst, supra note 30 (offering an exception to a provision requiring
gainful employment for circumstances in which a “beneficiary is either (i) occupied on a
full-time basis caring for other family members such as children or disabled or elderly
relatives, or (ii) married and [the family’s homemaker], and, in either case, the
provided that the new spouse has never gone to law school.”44 A provi-
sion also might penalize a beneficiary who decides to divorce,45 or a
beneficiary who lives and has a conjugal relationship with a person to
whom the beneficiary is not married.46 The websites and articles do not
suggest that a settlor might attempt to disrupt a marriage or encourage
divorce through an incentive provision; such a provision likely would be
void as contrary to public policy.47
In many cases, the likely goal of a settlor who wishes to encourage
marriage is to encourage procreation. In some cases this is made explicit,
and anecdotal evidence suggests that the tactic can be effective. One
article describes a trust created by a settlor who wanted more grandchil-
dren. The trust named the settlor’s children as beneficiaries and tied the
amount each child received to the number of offspring the child had.
According to the settlor’s attorney, the settlor more than doubled the
number of grandchildren within three years.48 Other common provisions
offer a financial incentive for a beneficiary who leaves the workplace to
stay at home with young children or marries a stay-at-home parent.49 The
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beneficiary’s spouse, if any, works full-time or is unable to work full-time for medical or
other reasons”).
50 See, e.g., Ashley, supra note 30 (explaining that a “trust can match the income
earned by [one’s] children [and] make the match greater at the low end, encouraging
philanthropic or other helping occupations such as teaching”); The Bank of New York,
supra note 30 (stating that “the trust could compensate family members who regularly
volunteer their time to charitable work, such as hosting fund-raisers or running a
foundation”); Berrall, supra note 33 (“Other requirements might include community
activity or involvement with certain charitable organizations.”); Clark Hill PLC, supra
note 30 (“An incentive trust . . . can reward a beneficiary who participates in the family
charitable foundation.”); Guertin, supra note 37 (stating that a trust can promote
“volunteering for charitable causes supported by the Trustmaker”); KDV, supra note 30
(noting that a trust can “help beneficiaries earn extra cash by caring for sick relatives or
performing volunteer work”); Merrill Lynch, supra note 30 (stating that the trust can
reward milestones such as “philanthropic accomplishments”); Sharpe, supra note 34
(“Philanthropy is another area many choose to promote. This is usually accomplished
through the child or grandchild’s involvement in a family foundation or donor.”); Terry
Balding & Associates, supra note 30 (“An incentive trust might pay income or principal. . .
if the beneficiary . . . does work for the family charitable foundation.”).
51 See, e.g., The Bank of New York, supra note 30 (explaining that a trust might
“match a percentage of financial contributions your loved ones make to charity”); Bell
Capital Management, supra note 36 (noting that some trusts “provide matching funds for
heirs’ contributions to favored organizations”); Clark Hill PLC, supra note 30 (noting that
“[f]ostering community involvement and volunteerism can take the form of matching
charitable donations”); Tarquinio, supra note 16 (interviewing an estate planner who
“tries to discourage overtly negative incentives, instead pushing clients toward positive
reinforcement, such as matching charitable contributions”); Terry Balding & Associates,
supra note 30 (suggesting that a trust distribute funds “if the beneficiary . . . donates a
certain amount to charity”); Wells Marble & Hurst, supra note 30 (“An incentive trust
may encourage charitable giving by the beneficiaries by, for example, matching
contributions, or paying a set percentage of income to charity each year and making the
beneficiaries meet to decide where the charitable dollars will be spent.”).
obvious rationale for such provisions is that having one parent stay at
home is better for the children.
Some settlors apparently want to encourage their beneficiaries to
engage in charitable activities. A trust might distribute money on the basis
of philanthropic work or accomplishments, including involvement with a
family charitable foundation.50 Alternatively, a settlor might choose to
match contributions that beneficiaries make to charitable organizations or
to provide funding for such contributions.51 Provisions of this kind are
thought to foster a sense of altruism in the beneficiaries.
The final category of provisions commonly noted in the incentive
trust literature involves income and employment. Many wealthy people
want their children and grandchildren to work hard, and they believe they
can use incentive trusts to reward productivity. For example, many
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52 See, e.g., Candy J. Cooper, Where There’s a Will . . . Experts Show Wealthy How
to Prevent “Affluenza” in Children, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 18, 2001, at 26A
(explaining that some families “set up ‘incentive trusts,’ in which a child receives a dollar
for every dollar earned”); Langley, supra note 14, at A1 (discussing a trust that matches
the beneficiaries’ “earned income up to $100,000”); Deborah Rankin, The Perils of
Raising Rich Kids, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 1986, at F11 (noting that incentive trusts can
“match or double the income a child earns from his or her salary”); Ashley, supra note 30
(“The trust can match the income earned by your children, thus encouraging them to be
productive.”); The Bank of New York, supra note 30 (“For your children in the working
world, you might set up a salary match incentive.”); Bell, supra note 34 (offering an
example of a provision in which “[t]he trustee shall pay to Son, annually, an amount equal
to Son’s wages, salaries, tips, etc., as indicated on Son’s Form(s) W-2 for the previous
year”); Berrall, supra note 33 (stating that “the trust may be set up to distribute funds as
part of a matching formula based on earnings from employment”); City National Bank,
supra note 30 (suggesting that a “trustee can be directed to give a beneficiary . . . a 50
percent match of salary”); Clark Hill PLC, supra note 30 (discussing the possibility of an
“incentive trust that provides matching earnings”); Bruce Fenton, Incentive Trusts,
http://www.fentonreport.com/wealth_articles/estate_planning/incentive_trusts.htm (last
visited Sept. 12, 2006) (stating that “payouts can be structured to match income goals
achieved by the heirs”); The Glenview Trust Company, supra note 30: 
[I]f you believe in the importance of a productive life and fear that a
large inheritance will put a damper on ambition, an incentive trust can
be fashioned to provide for the distribution of assets only if a child
has earned income; in which case, payouts often are designed to
match salary (dollar for dollar, for example).
Personal Benefit Services of Colorado, supra note 38 (“An heir between the ages of 25
and 35, say, could get a dollar-for-dollar match of earnings exceeding $40,000. Then, as
the son or daughter got older, the income level needed to achieve matching by the trust
could be ratcheted up.”); Saalfeld, supra note 35 (“Some parents state that the Trustee will
distribute to the child an amount equal to the child’s W-2 earnings.”); Stenner, supra note
30 (“I’ve seen incentive trusts structured to make payments based on a percentage of what
the child earned—excellent motivation for the child to go out and earn a living.”); Terry
Balding & Associates, supra note 30 (“If the beneficiary earns a certain level of pay, the
trust might pay out a matching amount for each dollar earned by the beneficiary. Some
match a higher amount the more money the beneficiary makes.”); Weston, supra note 32
(“Affluent parents who want to encourage their children to work for a living may create
trusts that match earned income dollar-for-dollar or link payouts to the beneficiaries’ own
efforts to increase their net worth.”).
53 See, e.g., Buffone, supra note 30; Wells Marble & Hurst, supra note 30. It also has
been termed the “beach-bum provision.” See Cooper, supra note 52, at 26A.
websites and articles discussing incentive trusts mention provisions that
pay out a certain amount of money from the trust for every dollar that the
beneficiary earns on her own.52 This is sometimes described as the “earn a
dollar, get a dollar” arrangement.53 The trust can direct the trustee to
examine the beneficiary’s W-2 forms to determine whether the
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54 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 34; Saalfeld, supra note 35.
55 See Zane, supra note 14, at 25 (suggesting that some settlors “try to make the
dissolute thrifty by matching their savings”).
56 See, e.g., Buffone, supra note 30 (describing trusts in which “children may receive
a specified amount of money when they . . . join the family business”); Clark Hill PLC,
supra note 30 (“Incentive provisions can reward a beneficiary who takes over—or
assumes important responsibilities in—a family business.”); The Glenview Trust
Company, supra note 30 (“Additional distributions from the trust might be made available
for a beneficiary . . . to continue the operation of a family farm . . . .”); Terry Balding &
Associates, supra note 30 (suggesting that a trust can pay income or principal if the
beneficiary “takes over the family business”).
57 See Zane, supra note 14 (noting that some settlors offer financial rewards for
beneficiaries who “enter the same profession as they did”).
58 See, e.g., Langley, supra note 14, at A1 (discussing an incentive of “$200,000 to
set up a veterinary practice or any other business, as long as [the beneficiary] has done
well in school”); The Glenview Trust Company, supra note 30 (stating that the trust could
encourage “a beneficiary whom you would like to see set up a certain business or
professional practice”); KDV, supra note 30 (suggesting that the trust could “match[ ]the
beneficiary’s share . . . of costs for events such as . . . business start-ups”); Merrill Lynch,
supra note 30 (explaining that a trust can distribute money upon “career milestones, such
as starting a business”); Weston, supra note 32 (“Parents who want to produce
entrepreneurs can turn the trusts into seed-money generators, matching any cash the
beneficiary raises from other sources.”).
59 See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 52, at 26A (suggesting that a trust could provide
“more for serving society”); Blaine Harden, Brat Control on Easy Street; Rich Parents
Get Tips on Raising Kids Not to Be Rotten, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2000, at B1 (“A child,
for instance, might get more money if he became a teacher, rather than an international
playboy.”); Langley, supra note 14, at A1 (discussing a trust that provides “a $15,000
income supplement for any descendant who becomes a teacher”); The Bank of New York,
supra note 30 (“[F]or those who use their talents in ways that don’t necessarily garner a
high wage, such as work in the nonprofit world, you could ensure that they, too, are
recognized for their efforts.”); Bell Capital Management, supra note 36 (“Trusts can be . .
. used to offer focused financial support to beneficiaries who opt to follow paths that are
personally and socially rewarding yet generally less lucrative.”); Buffone, supra note 30
beneficiary qualifies for the disbursement.54 A settlor also might match
the beneficiary’s savings rather than income.55
If the settlor has more specific career goals in mind for the benefi-
ciary, an incentive trust also can accommodate these goals. A settlor, for
example, might reward the beneficiary for joining or taking over a family
business or farm.56 The settlor also could reward the beneficiary for
entering the same profession as the settlor.57 Alternatively, the settlor
might encourage the beneficiary to start his own business, perhaps by
matching contributions from other sources.58 The settlor also might
choose to reward a beneficiary who enters a profession that benefits
society or is more personally rewarding even though it is less lucrative,
such as teaching, nursing, religious service, or social work.59 One article
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(“[In some cases,] the heads of the family want to communicate the value of service to
their offspring. In these cases the donors provide special supplements for those children
who become nurses, teachers, college professors, artists, social workers and the like.”);
City National Bank, supra note 30 (suggesting “[a]dditional compensation for performing
public benefit work (e.g., teaching, social work), so that their total earnings approximate
what he/she might make as a private industry executive”); Clark Hill PLC, supra note 30
(explaining that trusts can “provid[e] additional income to a beneficiary working in a low-
paying career such as teaching, social work or a particular religious calling”); The
Glenview Trust Company, supra note 30 (“[I]f the goal is to encourage a social
conscience, the trust could provide for supplemental payments when a child enters a
career that you favor—for instance, as a teacher, social worker or member of the
clergy.”); Sharpe, supra note 34: 
[O]ne child may be a special education teacher while another is a top
executive for an international company. It can be a delicate balance to
try to determine exactly how to develop a benefit plan for these vastly
different career choices . . . . One way would be to provide an added
benefit to the heir who has chosen a career path that benefits society
but may not be as lucrative.
Tarquinio, supra note 16 (explaining that a trust can be used to “pay[] for missionary
work”); Wells Marble & Hurst, supra note 30 (suggesting a clause to provide for a
beneficiary who “works at least 35 hours per week (‘full-time’), with or without
compensation, in a socially useful vocation (examples of such a vocation include, but are
not limited to, the fields of social work, teaching, religious service and charitable work)”).
60 Scroggin, supra note 32, at 87.
suggests creating a “Family Nobel Prize,” disbursed every five years to
reward the settlor’s descendant “who has been designated by [third party]
to have made the most significant contribution in the field of [charity,
education, science, law, humanities, medicine, etc.].”60
B. Administration and Modification
There is no fixed template that an incentive trust must follow. Never-
theless, practitioner articles suggest some ways in which an incentive trust
might be drafted. These articles may reflect a skewed sample of the estate
planning bar because  many (or perhaps most) estate planners do not
publicize their trust-drafting strategies; however, they do give some
indication of the possibilities. Of particular interest are these articles’
suggestions regarding how the conditions are to be administered and how
the trust may be modified.
With regard to administration of the conditions, the principal choice is
who will serve as trustee. One practitioner suggests that three cotrustees
be chosen, one of whom must not be a member of the family. The trust
might provide that the trustees choose their own successors, that a major-
ity of the adult beneficiaries choose successor trustees, or for some hybrid
of the two options. A settlor also might select an institutional trustee to
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61 See Scroggin, supra note 32, at 83–84.
62 See Henderson, supra note 37, at 16; Hodgman & Stetter, supra note 37, at 467.
63 See Henderson, supra note 37, at 16.
64 See, e.g., Bell, supra note 34 (“The client should choose a trustee who will be able
to not only manage the trust assets but also stand up to difficult family members.”);
Berrall, supra note 33: 
You may choose a family member or close friend as trustee, but this
person might not be objective or could be too removed from family
decision-making to see that the trust’s required goals are met. An
impartial, experienced professional trustee can make the most sense to
help ensure that provisions drawn up in the trust document are strictly
carried out.
Personal Benefit Services of Colorado, supra note 38 (“A family member or close friend
might let emotions cloud his or her judgment in making incentive distributions. So an
independent outside trustee is usually put in charge of determining whether a beneficiary
has qualified to receive trust assets.”); Wells Marble & Hurst, supra note 30: 
For obvious reasons, the use of an independent trustee is advisable,
and for long-term trusts, this usually indicates a corporate trustee.
Although corporate trustees may seem impersonal in the minds of
some clients, impartiality may be more important in this case. . . . The
advisory committee may be advisory only, or final authority may be
given the committee, however, in the latter case, the trustee has no
obligation regarding distributions, so why have a corporate trustee in
the first place?
65 See Scroggin, supra note 32, at 84.
66 See Henderson, supra note 37, at 18.
administer the trust and invest the trust funds, while leaving discretionary
decisions to individuals.61 This might be accomplished through an advi-
sory committee composed of individuals selected by the settlor or by
representatives of each line of descendants.62 If the beneficiaries elect the
members of the advisory committee, however, there is a danger that the
decisions of the committee will lack objectivity.63 For this reason, finan-
cial advisers (some of whom have a vested interest in attracting trust
business) caution settlors to leave decisions concerning distributions to an
independent party such as a corporate trustee and not to make the deci-
sions of any advisory committee binding on the trustee.64
Estate planners envision the possibility that it might be necessary to
remove one of the trustees. One author suggests giving the individual
trustees the power to remove the institutional trustee and also allowing the
beneficiaries to remove one or more trustees, provided that the remaining
trustees or a super-majority of the adult beneficiaries approve.65 Another
author suggests that the beneficiaries have a limited power to remove the
trustee that can be exercised only every two or three years unless the
beneficiaries can show cause for the trustee’s removal.66
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67 See Scroggin, supra note 32, at 84.
68 See Henderson, supra note 37, at 17–18. 
69 Id.
70 See Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiduciary Duty, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2763 (2006). The appointment of a trust protector can help to
deal with some of the agency costs associated with private trusts, but it also raises agency
problems of its own. See id.; see also Gregory S. Alexander, Trust Protectors: Who Will
Watch the Watchmen?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV 2807 (2006).
Practitioner articles also discuss the possibility that a trust might need
to be modified due to changed circumstances. One estate planner suggests
allowing non-disposition modifications by the unanimous decision of the
trustees with the approval of the adult beneficiaries.67 Another lawyer
proposes that the trustee have the power to amend administrative provi-
sions of the trust without court approval and that various measures be
taken to facilitate court-supervised modification of the dispositive provi-
sions.68 These measures include allowing living beneficiaries to represent
the interests of minor and unborn beneficiaries, allowing a modification to
go forward without the approval of all beneficiaries, lessening the factual
burden required by statute, and giving “an unrelated ‘Trust Protector’ the
power to amend the dispositive provisions of the trust without court inter-
vention.”69
C. The Problem of Inflexibility
The suggestion that a trust protector be appointed is an interesting
possibility, but it is not a panacea. A trust protector is a person other than
the trustee selected by the settlor to stand in the shoes of the settlor after
the settlor’s death and make decisions regarding the trust.70 An obvious
problem with giving an individual trust protector the power to amend the
trust is that such a person eventually will die, as will any individual
chosen as trustee. Any modification scheme must take into account the
mortality of individuals to whom discretionary power is given. A corpo-
rate trustee does not have this drawback, but the settlor may have less
confidence that a corporate trustee will share her ethical framework. It is
therefore important to note that, if a trust is not drafted carefully, provi-
sions designed to encourage certain behavior may not take into account
unforeseen circumstances. Of particular concern are conditions relating to
education, employment, marriage, and  procreation, although other condi-
tions also may create problems. 
With regard to educational conditions, an obvious possibility is that a
beneficiary might be unfit to attend college and may need more support
for this reason. This could happen, for example, if the beneficiary suffers
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from a learning disability. Such a beneficiary might not be accepted into a
college or might have great difficulty achieving the minimum GPA fixed
by the trust.71  If the settlor sets the bar too high, even beneficiaries with-
out learning disabilities may be unable to meet the conditions. A provi-
sion distributing trust funds upon the beneficiary’s graduation from
Harvard may not offer much of an incentive to a beneficiary who is
rejected by that institution.72 If the trust does not provide an adequate
modification mechanism, however, the beneficiaries may be bound by the
terms of the trust. 
Conditions relating to employment also could pose difficulties. Acci-
dent or illness could leave a beneficiary unable to work.73 The “earn a
dollar, get a dollar” arrangement, moreover, could penalize a beneficiary
who loses a job for circumstances beyond the beneficiary’s control, such
as a downturn in the economy. It also rewards high-paying jobs rather
than jobs that may offer more satisfaction or benefit society in some way.
While some settlors might include an exception to the “earn a dollar, get a
dollar” clause for socially beneficial employment,74 it might prove diffi-
cult to define what employment qualifies as socially beneficial. Likewise,
a beneficiary who chooses to stay at home with young children will be
penalized unless the trust expressly provides for this.
A settlor’s conditioning money on the beneficiary marrying a certain
type of person could present problems if the beneficiary is unable to find
a suitable spouse who meets the requisite qualifications. This is an old
problem that is not limited to incentive trusts. For example, the case of
Shapira v. Union National Bank75 involved a provision in a will stating
that the testator’s son was to receive his share only if he married a “Jew-
ish girl whose both parents were Jewish.”76 In seeking to have the condi-
tion set aside, the son argued that the number of available Jewish women
in his area was extremely small.77 The court refused to set aside the condi-
tion.78
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A condition distributing money when the beneficiary has children
also could lead to problems if the beneficiary is infertile and the condition
is not drafted in such a way as to include adopted children. Even if the
trust takes into account the possibility of adoption, a beneficiary might not
be approved by an adoption agency or might be barred from adopting a
child (for example, in some states, a person involved in a same-sex rela-
tionship cannot adopt).79 In these circumstances, the beneficiary might
suffer a financial penalty on account of a condition that already is the
source of considerable grief. Provisions that reward the beneficiary for
being a stay-at-home parent also could be problematic if the individual is
incapable of having children.
Drafting the trust in such a way as to give someone the power to
modify it in light of changed circumstances could avoid these problems of
inflexibility. Some incentive trusts, however, simply may be drafted
poorly. Moreover, some settlors may feel strongly enough about the
conditions they have drafted that they do not want them to be modified
under any circumstances. A settlor may be more concerned about the
possibility that the distribution scheme will be thwarted under pressure
from the beneficiaries than the possibility that the trust might prove to be
inflexible in light of changed circumstances. In such situations, the ques-
tion is whether a court should be able to modify the trust notwithstanding
the wishes of the settlor.80
III. JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF TRUSTS
For more than a century, American law has limited the ability of a
court to modify or terminate a trust after the settlor’s death.81 Absent some
violation of law or public policy, American courts are forbidden from
interfering with the material purposes of a trust. This traditional American
approach differs markedly from the approach taken in England, where
courts have broad powers to modify or terminate trusts at the petition of
the beneficiaries.82 In recent years, however, law reformers have spear-
headed efforts to relax the American rule and to give greater effect to the
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needs of the beneficiaries.83 Reformers point to the abolition of the Rule
Against Perpetuities (“Rule”) as a principal reason why change is neces-
sary.84 Some argue that because a noncharitable trust now can last forever,
it is necessary to make the settlor’s original scheme easier to undo.  The
proposed reforms, which are represented in particular by the Third Re-
statement, could directly impact incentive trusts by giving beneficiaries an
opportunity to argue that conditions imposed by the settlor should no
longer be applied. Whether the proposed reforms are desirable is open to
debate.
A. The Traditional Rule
Some evidence suggests that, prior to the late nineteenth century,
American courts liberally granted petitions by beneficiaries to modify or
terminate trusts.85 However, the Massachusetts case of Claflin v. Claflin86
reversed this trend in 1889. Claflin involved a will that bequeathed per-
sonal property to trustees with instructions to distribute $10,000 to the
testator’s son when he turned twenty-one, $10,000 when he turned
twenty-five, and the balance when he turned thirty. After the testator
turned twenty-one and received the first installment of the money, but
before he turned twenty-five, he sued to compel the trustees to pay him
the balance of the trust fund.87 Citing the earlier case of Broadway Na-
tional Bank v. Adams,88 the Claflin court held “that a testator has a right to
dispose of his own property with such restrictions and limitations, not
repugnant to law, as he sees fit, and that his intentions ought to be carried
out, unless they contravene some positive rule of law, or are against
public policy.”89 Accordingly, the Claflin court saw “no good reason why
the intention of the testator should not be carried out” and upheld the
lower court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s suit.90
The rule of Claflin came to be known as the “Claflin doctrine” and
subsequently was adopted in most American jurisdictions.91 Although the
Claflin opinion did not use the term “material purpose,” the case
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subsequently was understood to stand for the proposition that a trust
cannot be terminated prior to the time fixed for termination, even if all the
beneficiaries consent, if termination would be contrary to a material
purpose of the settlor.92 Although Claflin dealt with a petition to terminate
a trust, the Claflin doctrine subsequently was extended to cover
modifications. Under the rule of the Restatement (Second) of Trusts, a
court may direct a trustee to deviate from the trust’s terms when “owing
to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him
compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of
the purposes of the trust,”93 but not “merely because such deviation would
be more advantageous to the beneficiaries.”94 This provision codified the
so-called equitable deviation doctrine, which gave courts some flexibility
to modify in light of changed circumstances when necessary to
accomplish the trust purposes. Even this limited power to modify,
however, applied only to the administrative terms of a trust, as the
comments and illustrations in the Second Restatement make clear.95
As Robert Sitkoff has argued, the Claflin doctrine serves the purpose
of aligning the interests of the settlor with those of the trustee.96 Because
the doctrine precludes modification or termination contrary to the settlor’s
purposes, the trustee need not defer to the interests of the beneficiaries
and can administer the trust in the way the settlor would have wanted.97 In
other words, the doctrine favors the ex ante wishes of the settlor over the
ex post preferences of the beneficiaries and frees the trustee from any
obligation to take the beneficiaries’ side when there is a conflict with the
settlor’s  wishes.
B. Reforming Trends
Deferring to the wishes of the settlor is not a universal goal, and the
Claflin doctrine is distinctly American. The English case of Saunders v.
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Vautier,98 decided in the mid-nineteenth century, reached the opposite
conclusion from Claflin and allowed the sole beneficiary of a trust to
terminate the trust at age twenty-one even though the settlor specified that
the trust property be distributed at age twenty-five. Under the Variation of
Trusts Act,99 enacted in 1958, English courts have broad powers to mod-
ify or terminate trusts on behalf of unascertained or underage beneficia-
ries. In deciding whether and how to modify or terminate a trust, English
courts tend to give less deference to the settlor’s intent.100
Given the strong historic inclination of American law to defer to the
settlor’s intent, it seems unlikely that the United States will move toward
the English position in the near future. In recent years, however, there has
been a trend toward allowing courts greater flexibility in deciding whether
to modify or terminate a trust.101 This trend is particularly evident in
California, for example, which enacted the following provision of the
California Probate Code in 1986:
If the continuance of the trust is necessary to carry out a
material purpose of the trust, the trust cannot be modified
or terminated unless the court, in its discretion, deter-
mines that the reason for doing so under the
circumstances outweighs the interest in accomplishing a
material purpose of the trust. Under this section the court
does not have discretion to permit termination of a trust
that is subject to a valid restraint on transfer of the benefi-
ciary's interest. . . .102
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This section of the California Probate Code gives courts the power to
balance the material purpose of a trust against the reasons for modifica-
tion or termination under the circumstances, provided that the beneficia-
ries agree that modification or termination is warranted.103 The intention
of the settlor remains a relevant factor, but the court now can take other
considerations into account, such as the needs of the beneficiaries. While
the last sentence of the section limits the application of the provision to
spendthrift trusts in which the beneficiary is forbidden to transfer his
interest, that restriction, by its terms, applies only to termination, not
modification.104
In addition to allowing the courts to balance the settlor’s intent
against the reasons for modification or termination, the California Probate
Code also extends the equitable deviation doctrine to cover dispositive as
well as administrative provisions of the trust. If the continuation of the
trust on its terms threatens to defeat or impair substantially the accom-
plishment of the trust purposes, the court “may modify the administrative
or dispositive provisions of the trust or terminate the trust.”105
The UTC, promulgated in 2000, does not follow the California Pro-
bate Code in allowing the court to balance the material purpose of the
trust against the reasons provided for its modification or termination. The
UTC instead offers two avenues for modification and termination, de-
pending on whether the court makes a finding of changed circumstances.
Under UTC section 411(b), for a court to modify or terminate a trust after
the settlor’s death without a finding of changed circumstances, all of the
beneficiaries must consent to the modification or termination, and the
court must conclude that modification or termination would not be “in-
consistent with a material purpose of the trust.”106 Thus, UTC section 411
essentially adheres to the Claflin doctrine, although a bracketed qualifica-
tion is made in subsection (c) that “[a] spendthrift provision in the terms
of the trust is not presumed to constitute a material purpose of the
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trust.”107 This provision was made optional in 2004 after it met resistance
from state legislatures.108
In section 412, the UTC followed the lead of the California Probate
Code in extending the equitable deviation doctrine to cover dispositive as
well as administrative provisions of a trust. The UTC provision also is
phrased differently: whereas the California Probate Code allows modifi-
cation or termination “if, owing to circumstances not known to the settlor
and not anticipated by the settlor, the continuation of the trust under its
terms would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the
purposes of the trust,”109 the UTC allows modification “if, because of
circumstances not anticipated by the settlor, modification or termination
will further the purposes of the trust.”110 The UTC provision further
specifies that “[t]o the extent practicable, the modification must be made
in accordance with the settlor’s probable intention.”111 The provision does
not require action by (or consent of) the beneficiaries.
Because the UTC allows modification only when consistent with the
purposes of the trust, it is more deferential to the settlor’s intent than the
California Probate Code. Nevertheless, another provision of the UTC
clarifies that the provisions relating to modification and termination are
mandatory law, which the settlor may not override in the trust instru-
ment.112 In other words, a settlor who does not trust the courts to decide
whether modification would “further the purposes of the trust,”113 and
who wishes to prevent a court from applying the expanded equitable
deviation doctrine under section 412 cannot do so.114 A settlor could
attempt to preempt the section by stating all the circumstances that the
settlor anticipated, but it might be difficult to produce an exhaustive
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list.115 To that extent, the UTC has the potential to thwart a settlor who
does not want modification under any circumstances.
In addition to its general modification provisions, the UTC contains a
specific provision dealing with removal of the trustee. Section 706(b)
allows removal of a trustee by a court when
(1) the trustee has committed a serious breach of trust;
(2) lack of cooperation among cotrustees substantially
impairs the administration of the trust;
(3) because of unfitness, unwillingness, or persistent
failure of the trustee to administer the trust effec-
tively, the court determines that removal of the
trustee best serves the interests of the beneficiaries;
or
(4) there has been a substantial change of circumstances
or removal is requested by all of the qualified beneficia-
ries, the court finds that removal of the trustee best
serves the interests of all of the beneficiaries and is not
inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust, and a
suitable cotrustee or successor trustee is available.116
The last of these provisions, section 706(b)(4), gives a court broad
power to replace the trustee when all the beneficiaries agree and when
modification does not violate a material purpose of the trust. This provi-
sion, however, is default law and “may be overridden by the settlor.”117
Unlike the UTC, the Third Restatement has embraced both general
modification reforms of the California Probate Code: the balancing test
and the expanded equitable deviation doctrine. Section 65 of the Third
Restatement is closely modeled on section 15403(b) of the California
Probate Code:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if all of the bene-
ficiaries of an irrevocable trust consent, they can
compel the termination or modification of the trust.
(2) If termination or modification of the trust under Sub-
section (1) would be inconsistent with a material
purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel
its termination or modification except with the con-
sent of the settlor or, after the settlor’s death, with
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authorization of the court if it determines that the
reason(s) for termination or modification outweigh
the material purpose.118
Like the California Probate Code, section 65 of the Third Restatement
allows a court to balance the reasons provided for termination or modifi-
cation against the material purpose of the trust when the beneficiaries are
in agreement. The settlor’s intent therefore remains a relevant consider-
ation, but it is not the only consideration. This is a significant departure
from the Claflin rule, and one not paralleled in the UTC. Moreover,
unlike section 15403(b) of the California Probate Code, section 65 of the
Third Restatement does not limit the court’s ability to terminate a trust
subject to a spendthrift provision. The Third Restatement also adopts an
equitable deviation provision similar to that in the UTC, allowing the
court to “modify an administrative or distributive provision of a trust, or
direct or permit the trustee to deviate from an administrative or distribu-
tive provision, if because of circumstances not anticipated by the settlor
the modification or deviation will further the purposes of the trust.”119
The Third Restatement does not address the question of whether a
settlor could override its modification and termination provisions by
language in the trust instrument. A settlor, for example,  might recite a list
of incentives or restrictions in the trust instrument and state explicitly that
those incentives or restrictions constitute a material purpose of the trust.
Yet the Third Restatement seems to allow modification even when the
material purposes of the trust are made explicit. Absent a provision stating
that the terms of the trust take precedence, the implication is that the
provisions of the Third Restatement are mandatory. If a state adopted the
approach of the Third Restatement and made it mandatory law, a settlor
could not draft a trust so as to prevent a court from balancing the reasons
provided for modification or termination against the settlor’s purposes or
from applying the doctrine of equitable deviation.
The Third Restatement balancing test has been interpreted as applying
to a situation in which the beneficiaries wish to remove the trustee.120
Another provision in the Third Restatement, section 37, allows a court to
remove a trustee “for cause.”121 A comment lists several grounds for
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removal including unfitness, acquisition of a conflicting interest, repeated
failure to provide proper information to the beneficiaries, the commission
of a crime, “developments causing serious geographic inconvenience to
the beneficiaries,” or “a pattern of indifference toward some or all of the
beneficiaries.”122 The comment explains that “[f]riction between the
trustee and some of the beneficiaries is not a sufficient ground for remov-
ing the trustee unless it interferes with the proper administration of the
trust.”123 A “serious breakdown in communications between beneficiaries
and a trustee,” however, “may justify removal, particularly if the trustee is
responsible for the breakdown or it appears to be incurable.”124 Section 37
presumably is mandatory law, and, like section 65, it gives a court broad
discretion to decide whether a change in the settlor’s original plan is
necessary.
The approach of the Third Restatement is not the most ambitious
reform proposal that has been made in recent years. In his last article,
finished by James Krier after his death, Jesse Dukeminier proposed
various reforms that would make trustee removal and trust termination
even easier. Dukeminier and Krier suggested that statutes be enacted to
give beneficiaries the power to remove or replace the trustee and give the
trustee the power to terminate the trust.125 Dukeminier and Krier also
proposed that when all the beneficiaries of a trust known to the settlor
have died, the beneficiaries be given a statutory power to terminate or
modify the trust without court approval (provided that they do not exer-
cise the power in favor of themselves, their creditors, or their estates).
They also proposed giving the beneficiaries a power, limited by a statu-
tory standard, to withdraw principal for their own benefit.126 The proposed
statutes “would . . . be mandatory and applicable to all trusts.”127 These
proposed reforms go far beyond the UTC and the Third Restatement and
effectively would leave the duration of the trust up to the beneficiaries
and would allow the beneficiaries to dictate the trust’s terms after a cer-
tain period of time.128
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C. Abolition of the Rule Against Perpetuities
The current trend toward allowing easier modification and termina-
tion of trusts coincides with an important development regarding trust
duration: the abolition of the Rule. Abolition of the Rule has allowed the
creation of perpetual or near-perpetual dynasty trusts, which can serve to
keep property in a particular family for an unlimited number of genera-
tions. Advocates of modification and termination reform contend that, in
light of the rise of the perpetual trust, it is more critical than ever to make
it easier for courts to undo trusts after the settlor’s death.
Until recently, private noncharitable trusts were limited in duration by
the Rule, the classic formulation of which provided that “[n]o interest is
good unless it must vest, if at all, not later than twenty-one years after
some life in being at the creation of the interest.”129  The idea behind the
Rule was that settlors should not be able to tie up property beyond the
lives of people they knew and the minority of their children.130 The origi-
nal Rule, which mercilessly invalidated interests based on hypothetical
possibilities, was reformed in many jurisdictions in the second half of the
twentieth century so that a court could “wait and see” what actually
happened.131 This process culminated in the Uniform Statutory Rule
Against Perpetuities (“USRAP”), which provided a ninety-year wait-and-
see period.132 
USRAP, like the other wait-and-see reforms promoted by legal schol-
ars in the second half of the twentieth century, did not allow for the
creation of perpetual noncharitable trusts. For some time, however, Idaho
and Wisconsin had allowed the creation of such trusts, provided that the
power of alienation was not suspended.133 South Dakota joined this list in
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1983.134 In 1995, Delaware abolished the Rule, which triggered a race
among other jurisdictions to abolish the Rule or to limit drastically its
effect.135 Three states and the District of Columbia abolished the Rule
before 1986, and by early 2005, legislation abolishing or limiting Rule
had been enacted in sixteen other states.136 The list of states that have
abolished the Rule is likely to grow.
The movement to abolish the Rule appears to be related to a federal
tax exemption. For many years, wealthy people were able to avoid the
federal estate tax by creating trusts with successive life estates, which
could continue as long as the Rule permitted.137 Congress eventually
closed this loophole by enacting a tax on generation-skipping transfers,
which was enacted in 1976 and substantially reconfigured in 1986.138 In
enacting the 1986 Generation-Skipping Transfer tax (GST), however,
Congress included an exemption of $1 million for each transferor.139 This
exemption has been increased to $1.5 million for decedents dying in 2004
and 2005; $2 million in 2006, 2007, and 2008; and $3.5 million in
2009.140 Accordingly, it is now possible to create a generation-skipping
trust worth up to $2 million that will not be subject to the GST.141
Settlors creating perpetual dynasty trusts no doubt are attracted, at
least in part, by the GST exemption. In a recent empirical study, Max
Schanzenbach and Robert Sitkoff found that there was “little demand for
perpetual trusts before the enactment of the GST tax.”142 It is important to
note, however, that the tax advantages of dynasty trusts were even greater
prior to the enactment of the GST; if tax reasons were the only motivation
for creating such trusts, one would expect to see fewer dynasty trusts
created after 1986, not more. The impact of the GST as an advertising
FALL 2006 Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem   477
143 See Tate, supra note 25, at 613–17. Schanzenbach and Sitkoff concede that, even
“if the transfer taxes were abolished, some demand for perpetual trusts might persist.”
Schanzenbach & Sitkoff, supra note 133, at 2468 (footnote omitted). See also Mary
Louise Fellows, Why the Generation-Skipping Transfer Tax Sparked Perpetual Trusts, 27
CARDOZO L. REV. 2511, 2520 (2006) (identifying “[d]ead hand control, dismissiveness of
donees’ rights to control property, USRAP, and the commercialization of estate planning”
as factors that have worked together with the GST exemption to bring about the popularity
of the perpetual trust).
144 See Chester, supra note 26, at 700 (“If the trend continues toward allowing and
creating long-term trusts and expanding the spendthrift limitations protecting them, the
need for easier modification and termination of such trusts will increase.” (footnote
omitted)); Dukeminier & Krier, supra note 25, at 1331:
With a perpetual trust . . . [restrictions on modification and
termination] will go on forever. Even though perpetual trusts were
one of the most significant trust developments of the late twentieth
century, they are not mentioned in the Uniform Trust Code. It should
be amended to apply different modification and termination rules to
perpetual trusts.
tool helps explain the fact that dynasty trusts became more popular after
the enactment of the tax: estate planners could promote dynasty trusts by
pointing to the GST exemption and encouraging their clients to take
advantage of it. But promotional materials suggest that there are many
reasons other than tax savings that might justify the creation of a dynasty
trust. For example, some settlors might use perpetual dynasty trusts as
incentive trusts, encouraging their descendants to be hardworking mem-
bers of society.143  
Proponents of modification and termination reform have pointed to
the rise of the perpetual dynasty trust as a reason why statutes should
mandate more flexibility to respond to changed conditions.144 If some
settlors are structuring perpetual dynasty trusts as incentive trusts, how-
ever, it is possible that they may not want a court to have broad powers to
modify or terminate a trust when doing so conflicts with their material
purposes. Even if this group is a relatively small fraction of the settlor
population, it should be taken into account in deciding what the modifica-
tion and termination rules should be.
D. Default and Mandatory Rules
An example may serve to show why a settlor might not want a court
to exercise its power to modify or terminate a trust in the interest of the
beneficiaries. Suppose that a settlor, who has one daughter living in a
common law state, creates an incentive trust that names the daughter as
the beneficiary. The trust provides a dollar of income from the trust for
every dollar that the beneficiary earns herself. The intention of the settlor
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is to encourage his daughter to lead a productive life. No provision in the
trust allows for a greater match of income if she chooses to pursue a
socially valuable profession.
Now suppose that the settlor dies, and the trustee begins to administer
the trust. The daughter decides she wants to become a sculptor. She
attends sculpting classes and gains some proficiency. She has some talent
and is able to sell some of her sculptures. However, her income from this
endeavor is relatively small, say $20,000 per year. Her friends, on the
other hand, are earning six-figure salaries in the business world. The
daughter petitions the court to modify the trust to match her income on a
three-to-one basis, so that she receives three dollars from the trust for
every dollar that she earns selling her sculptures.
The court now faces the question of whether to modify the trust to
allow a greater match for the artistic child. Suppose first that the jurisdic-
tion in question has adopted the UTC. Under the UTC, the court may
modify the trust upon a finding that, “because of circumstances not antici-
pated by the settlor, modification or termination will further the purposes
of the trust.”145 The court might decide that the beneficiary’s decision to
become a sculptor is a circumstance not anticipated by the settlor and that
modifying the trust to provide a three-to-one match will further the pur-
poses of the trust. In making this decision, the court will try to construe
the “settlor’s probable intention.”146
If the jurisdiction in question is California, or if the jurisdiction
follows the Third Restatement, the court has even greater flexibility. Even
if the court finds that modifying the trust to help the budding sculptor
would violate a material purpose of the trust, the court can balance that
material purpose against the beneficiary’s reasons for modification. If the
balance weighs in favor of modification, the sculptor will prevail.
None of this poses any difficulty if the settlor actually would have
wanted the trust to be modified. But what if the settlor would not have
wanted to encourage his daughter’s artistic endeavors? What if the settlor
wanted the dollar-for-dollar match to be applied without exception? In
that case, the prescient settlor living in a UTC jurisdiction might state in
the trust that he anticipated the possibility that his child might wish to
become an artist, thereby precluding the application of the equitable
deviation doctrine. A settlor would face some difficulty, however, in
writing into the trust a prediction of every possible circumstance that
might arise. Moreover, in a jurisdiction that follows the Third Restatement
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as mandatory law, the settlor would have no way to prevent modification
regardless of what terms he included in the trust. The court would have
the authority to decide that the settlor’s plan was simply inferior to the
alternative offered by the beneficiary.
If the provisions of the UTC and the Third Restatement were made
default law, these issues would not create any problems for settlors be-
cause they could avoid them in drafting the trust instrument. The ques-
tion, then, is whether there is a sound policy basis for allowing settlors to
override statutory modification and termination provisions. If so, then
modification and termination rules such as the Third Restatement balanc-
ing test should be enacted as default law; if not, then mandatory rules are
necessary. The next section of this Article will consider the wisdom of
restrictions in incentive trusts in light of broader debates about the justifi-
cation for testamentary freedom in general.
IV. THE DEAD HAND
Overriding the settlor’s intent in the law of trusts has consequences.
Individuals who know that their intent cannot be carried out in a trust may
behave differently: they may choose to spend money during their lifetime
that they might have left for their descendants in a trust, or they may
choose to alter the plan of their trust and leave their property to different
individuals or entities or to vary the amount left to each beneficiary. In
other words, when the law imposes a mandatory rule with respect to
trusts, it may have an impact on what potential settlors do with their
money. Whether this is a good thing depends on the reasons for or against
allowing dead hand control.
A. Policy Justifications for the Dead Hand
In an article published in 1992, Adam Hirsch and William Wang
surveyed the different rationales for testamentary freedom and analyzed
which of them ought to apply to future interests.147 Hirsch and Wang
identified six different justifications for dead hand control. Each has its
proponents and detractors, although some rationales may be more persua-
sive than others.
The first rationale that historically has been offered for freedom of
testation is that there is a natural right to leave one’s property to persons
of one’s choosing. This view is associated with the seventeenth-century
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157 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 181 (George E. Woodbine
& Samuel E. Thorne eds. & trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1968) (circa 1230) [hereinafter
philosophers Locke and Grotius.148 Grotius’s view was that, because
testation “in its essential character . . . is related to ownership . . . it be-
longs to the law of nature,” even though it “can take a definite form in
accordance with municipal law.”149 Locke viewed the right of testation as
stemming from the fact that each individual owned his own person and
therefore owned the fruits of his labor.150 Locke also indicated, however,
that the testator’s right to bequeath was qualified by his duty to provide
for his children.151
An early criticism of Locke’s view, offered by William Paley, was
that Locke’s explanation only accounted for property earned through
“personal labour,” and other forms of property, especially property in
land, did not fall in this category.152 Accordingly, Paley did not think a
natural right to dispose of land after death existed.153 Other eighteenth-
century writers rejected outright the notion that there was a natural right
of testation. Godwin considered it to be “the most extravagant fiction,
which would enlarge the empire of the proprietor beyond his natural
existence, and enable him to dispose of events, when he is himself no
longer in the world.”154 Similarly, Blackstone thought that “naturally
speaking, the instant a man ceases to be, he ceases to have any domin-
ion.”155 Although the “universal law of almost every nation” allowed
testation, it was not part of the primary law of nature.156
A second argument for testation is that allowing each individual to
decide how property will be used after death encourages work and
savings, thereby maximizing total wealth. This argument appears in the
thirteenth-century English legal treatise known as Bracton,157 and
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Arnold, De Legibus et Consuctudinibus Angliae, 91 HARV. L. REV. 517, 519 (1977) (book
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160 ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 158 (Pearson Addison
Wesley 4th ed. 2004).
161 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 147, at 8; see also A.C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS
OF WELFARE 718–19 (4th ed. 1932) (suggesting that transfer taxes “should impose a
relatively small check upon the creation of capital” because individuals have other reasons
to accumulate wealth besides the desire to direct its disposition after death).
162 Hirsch & Wang, supra note 147, at 8–9.
philosophers restated the argument in subsequent centuries.158 Forced
inheritance, arguably, would “discourage individual initiative and thrift,”
because people would have less incentive to accumulate property if they
could not choose who would receive it after death.159 A related argument
is that frustrating testamentary intent would lead to the depletion of
resources because people might “cut timber prematurely, exhaust soil’s
fertility by intensive farming, or postpone needed improvements to
buildings.”160
The notion that individuals work and save more because they have the
power of testation is subject to legitimate criticism. As Hirsch and Wang
note, individuals may strive to accumulate wealth beyond the needs of
lifetime consumption for a variety of reasons that are not related to the
power of testation.161 In many cases, persons may accumulate “to gratify
their egos, to gain prestige, to gain power—and simply out of habit. Once
these impulses are taken into account, the economic contributions trace-
able to freedom of testation could turn out to be small.”162
In recent decades, economists have debated the extent to which a
“bequest motive”—the desire to leave something behind after
death—plays an important role in the accumulation of wealth. The so-
called life-cycle hypothesis, which has provided a framework for research
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(1950).
168 See, e.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L.
& ECON. 1 (1988); B. Douglas Bernheim et al., The Strategic Bequest Motive, 93 J. POL.
ECON. 1045 (1985); Donald Cox, Motives for Private Income Transfers, 95 J. POL. ECON
on consumption and saving since the 1950s, assumes that the average
individual “neither expects to receive nor desires to leave any inheri-
tance.”163 This assumption was challenged by Laurence Kotlikoff and
Lawrence Summers, who argued that “the pure life-cycle component of
aggregate U.S. savings is very small” and that “American capital accumu-
lation results primarily from intergenerational transfers.”164 Subsequent
research on the subject has not produced a consensus.165 It may be the
case that, while wealth is primarily accumulated to guard against future
contingencies during life, the desire to bequeath wealth to future genera-
tions plays a secondary role.166
A third argument made in favor of testation, at least with regard to
bequests within the family, is that such bequests may reward the benefi-
ciaries for unpaid services rendered during the testator’s lifetime. Anthro-
pologists have shown that gifts are sometimes best understood in a con-
text of reciprocity and social exchange.167 Some economists have argued
that bequests may be used to reward children who are more attentive to
their parents in their old age.168 Various authors over the centuries have
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Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH. L. REV. 69, 112 (1990) (“Children
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171 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 147, at 11.
172 See, e.g., COOTER & ULEN, supra note 160, at 157 (suggesting that restrictions on
testation encourage individuals to give property away during life and lease it back);
GODWIN, supra note 154, at 445:
To attempt . . . to take the disposal out of their hands, at the period of
their decease, would be an abortive and pernicious project. If we
prevented them from bestowing [their property] in the open and
explicit mode of bequest, we could not prevent them from transferring
it before the close of their lives, and we should open a door to
vexatious and perpetual litigation.
1 HUTCHESON, supra note 158, at 352 (arguing that, if testation were eliminated, “men
must be forced into a pretty hazardous conduct by actually giving away during life
whatever they acquire beyond their own probable consumption in their lifetime”);
SIDGWICK, supra note 158, at 53 n.1 (suggesting that in the absence of testation “most
men would prefer either to exchange their capital somehow for a life-income or to transfer
it in old age—or when the prospect of death was otherwise near—to the objects of their
preference, rather than leave it to be absorbed by the State”); see also F.A. HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 91  (1960) (arguing that if testation were abolished “men
argued that testation is necessary to preserve the good order of the
family.169
One criticism of this rationale for testation is that it encourages bene-
ficiaries to engage in socially wasteful activities in the hope of capturing a
bequest.170 On the other hand, many children no doubt would continue to
care for elderly parents even if freedom of testation were abolished.
Whether a particular child looks after her parents may not be correlated
with that child’s expectations regarding inheritance.171
Another argument that sometimes is made in favor of freedom of
testation is that it would be difficult to curtail in practice. If inheritance
were abolished, individuals simply might give their property away during
life, evading the restriction.172 In response to this argument it may be
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177 See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 147, at 13.
178 M. Meston, The Power of the Will, 1982 JURID. REV. 172, 173.
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pointed out that freedom of testation leads to much litigation regarding
the decedent’s plan of succession.173 It is difficult to say whether this
social cost outweighs the difficulty posed by enforcing a restriction on
testation.174
A fifth argument in favor of freedom of testation is referred to by
Hirsch and Wang as the “father-knows-best” hypothesis.175 Under this
rationale, free testation is preferable to other schemes of distribution
because it permits more intelligent estate planning: the testator knows his
family members better than anyone else and can distribute property in
accordance each family member’s needs.176 This argument assumes that
distribution according to need is a social virtue and that the average
testator will behave rationally in creating an estate plan.
Hirsch and Wang criticize the father-knows-best hypothesis on the
grounds that many wills are drafted with little thought and testators can-
not be relied upon to make rational decisions.177 Making a will has been
called “an exercise of power without responsibility.”178 Deceased persons
do not suffer the consequences of their actions, and there is no guarantee
that a testator will plan wisely for her family. Nevertheless, Hirsch and
Wang acknowledge that a scheme under which courts exercise discretion
to distribute property in accordance with family circumstances would
“entail substantially higher information and administrative costs.”179
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The final argument for freedom of testation identified by Hirsch and
Wang is that the power to bequeath simply “comports with political prefer-
ences.”180 According to Lewis Simes, “[a] compelling argument in favor
of [testation] is that it accords with human wishes.”181 Adam Smith ex-
pressed the same sentiment by saying that “[w]e naturally find a pleasure
in remembering the last words of a friend and in executing his last injunc-
tions,” in what Smith termed “piety for the dead.”182 This argument,
however, does not extend necessarily to estate plans that are arbitrary or
unprincipled—piety for the dead only goes so far.183
B. The Dead Hand and Incentive Trusts
The six policy rationales identified by Hirsch and Wang speak to the
question of whether testation in general should be allowed. Whether these
rationales justify allowing an individual to attach conditions on access to
distributions by means of an incentive trust is another question, and the
answer depends in part on whether the beneficiaries of the trust are known
to the settlor.
To the extent that the beneficiaries of an incentive trust are known to
the settlor, at least two of the arguments in favor of testation offer a
plausible justification for incentive trusts. If individuals work harder and
save more when they know they can direct the disposition of their prop-
erty after death through testation, then it is possible that some individuals
would work and save even more if they are allowed to impose controls
through an incentive trust. Moreover, the father-knows-best hypothesis
arguably could apply to incentive trusts: if the parent knows his children
better than anyone else, it might be wise to allow the parent to set the
conditions that the children must meet in order to inherit the parent’s
fortune. This rationale depends, however, on the presumption that incen-
tive trusts are sometimes effective. If incentive trusts generally do not
have the desired effect of encouraging positive behavior, then it is diffi-
cult to see them as a manifestation of paternal wisdom.
The other justifications in favor of testation apply less obviously to
incentive trusts. Even if there is a natural right to bequeath, it would seem
a stretch to say that there is a natural right to impose specific conditions
on access to funds. The idea that bequests reward beneficiaries for
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services performed during life also does not apply when the goal of
testation is to withhold funds from children who may not meet the
parent’s expectations. Moreover, it would not be difficult to curtail
incentive trusts in practice because an individual cannot recreate an
incentive trust by giving all the property away during life. Finally, the
notion that testation comports with political preferences cannot be
extended to legal constructs that are foreign to most of the general public.
These rationales are even less applicable when the topic is not incen-
tive trusts in general, but incentive trusts that are designed to distribute
funds to unborn generations. Even the father-knows-best argument, which
can be invoked in defense of incentive trusts generally, carries less weight
when the beneficiaries known to the settlor have died. As Lord Hobhouse
remarked in the nineteenth century,
[a] clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those
persons and events which the Settlor knows and sees, and those
which he cannot know or see. Within the former province we
may trust his natural affections and his capacity of judgment to
make better dispositions than any external Law is likely to make
for him. Within the latter, natural affection does not extend, and
the wisest judgment is constantly baffled by the course of
events.184 
With regard to unborn generations, one might argue, only the
productivity-incentive theory of testation offers a clear justification for
allowing incentive trusts.185 
Another problem with the father-knows-best rationale as applied to
incentive trusts is that parents may be subject to what psychologists call
“attribution errors,” making unwarranted assumptions about their chil-
dren.186 Estate planners report that individuals who seek estate planning
advice tend to judge others as less capable than themselves and to inflate
their own ability to plan for others.187 Parents may assume without good
cause that their children cannot take care of themselves and may attach
unwarranted strings to a trust as a consequence of this bias. Moreover, as
one prominent estate planner has observed, “it is impossible to measure
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empirically all of the ways a child can become productive and lead a
worthwhile life.”188 Even those parents who have a realistic view of their
children’s abilities may fail to see that there are some careers in which
their children might excel.
Despite its limitations, the father-knows-best rationale may still have
some validity—even after the beneficiaries known to the settlor have
died—with regard to the broad issue of whether the beneficiaries should
be able to disregard the settlor’s wishes. The settlor’s insight, if any, into
the needs of  her children conceivably could translate into wisdom with
respect to the needs of young people generally (although the opposite
might be the case if the settlor lacks insight into her own children). Even
though the settlor had no knowledge of unborn beneficiaries, the beneficia-
ries’ own wishes with respect to the trust are not necessarily wiser or
better than the settlor’s plan. When the question is whether the details of a
particular plan should be respected by a court, however, the father-knows-
best justification arguably is limited to the generations known to the
settlor, and even then it has its limits.
We then have two possible justifications for incentive trusts, only one
of which clearly applies to incentive trusts that extend to unborn genera-
tions. As discussed above, the jury is still out on whether the desire to
leave bequests motivates people to work and save more.189 It is also
questionable whether this theory would extend to a desire to leave wealth
in the form of an incentive trust, let alone a desire to create an incentive
trust that cannot be modified by judicial intervention. Even more ques-
tionable is whether the incentives to work and save would vary signifi-
cantly depending on whether a court has the power to modify or terminate
the trust. While some settlors might be discouraged from working harder
or saving more if courts have broad modification and termination powers,
it seems unlikely that this is a large group. On the other hand, there might
be a greater number of settlors who would be discouraged by a law that
allowed beneficiaries to modify or terminate a trust or replace the trustee
without court approval, as suggested by Dukeminier and Krier.
The father-knows-best hypothesis may offer the strongest argument in
favor of allowing incentive trusts, at least as applied to beneficiaries
known to the settlor, if such trusts are indeed effective in some
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circumstances. If the settlor is the best person to decide how the property
should be distributed among the members of his family, and incentive
trusts are an effective tool for doing this, then the case for mandatory
court modification and termination powers is weakened. The question,
then, is how effective incentive trusts are likely to be.
C. The Effectiveness of Incentive Trusts
In considering whether incentive trusts are an effective tool, it is
necessary at first to acknowledge that too much unearned income can
have a negative impact on productivity. Some studies suggest that indi-
viduals who inherit large sums of money are more likely to leave the
labor force.190 Psychological costs, such as substance abuse, anxiety, and
depression, also are associated with being a child of wealthy parents.191
Receiving large unconditional bequests could compound these psycholog-
ical costs. “Affluenza,” a term “coined to describe an epidemic of
overconsumption and its often negative effects on children—alienation,
laziness, arrogance and low self esteem,”192 is not merely a hypothetical
problem. It may be particularly acute in families that have acquired a
significant amount of “new” money in the parents’ lifetime.
Incentive trusts have not been the subject of rigorous empirical analy-
sis. It is therefore difficult to say whether the incentives in question will
actually motivate beneficiaries to change their behavior. Some insight can
be gained, however, from studies of the effect of pay-for-performance
plans on employee performance and the effect of rewards on intrinsic
motivation.
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Economists and psychologists who have studied pay-for-performance
plans, which tie employee compensation to productivity, offer differing
opinions on whether these plans actually produce the desired behavior.
On the one hand, some argue that pay-for-performance plans are not
ineffective but rather “too effective: strong pay-for-performance moti-
vates people to do exactly what they are told to do.”193 According to this
view, the primary problem with pay-for-performance schemes is that it is
“difficult to adequately specify exactly what people should do and there-
fore how their performance should be measured.”194 Studies also show
that financial incentives are more likely to affect performance quantity
rather than performance quality.195 Money, however, is a highly effective
motivator.196
The view that financial incentives motivate performance has been
challenged, on the other hand, by those who think the effect of incentives
is merely temporary. Financial incentives, some argue, “do not alter the
attitudes that underlie our behaviors. They do not create an enduring
commitment to any value or action. Rather, incentives merely—and
temporarily—change what we do.”197 According to this view, offering
money to encourage certain types of behavior is not likely to work and
may even be counterproductive.198
The notion that financial incentives cannot change behavior perma-
nently is related to the psychological concepts of intrinsic and extrinsic
motivation. Financial incentives are an extrinsic motivator: they come
from outside rather than from within. Three decades of psychological
research have established that extrinsically mediated rewards may actually
reduce intrinsic motivation.199 For example, in a classic experiment,
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children who showed intrinsic interest in a drawing activity were assigned
randomly to one of three groups. The first group was offered a certificate
with a gold seal at the beginning of the experiment as a reward for contin-
uing to engage in the activity; the second group received the same reward
without having being told they would receive it; and the third group
received no award. The experiment found that the children who had
knowledge of the reward prior to engaging in the activity were less likely
subsequently to engage in the activity.200 Another early experiment found
similar results when the subjects were college students and the reward
was money.201 These experiments illustrate the so-called overjustification
hypothesis—the theory that an external award may undermine a person’s
intrinsic interest in an activity.202
The overjustification hypothesis suggests that a person is more likely
to develop a lasting interest in an activity when it is what Mihaly
Csikszentmihalyi has termed “autotelic”—when the person considers the
activity to be an end in itself.203 Incentive trusts, which use extrinsic
rewards as a motivator, may actually lead to the opposite of the intended
result. If a beneficiary is paid to graduate from college, the beneficiary
may finish school but lose the possibility of lifelong intellectual curiosity.
Similarly, a beneficiary whose income is matched dollar-for-dollar may
elect to work at a high-paying job but may not be motivated to work any
harder or more efficiently than is necessary to avoid being fired. In addi-
tion, when a beneficiary is forced to avoid doing something that she wants
to do, the beneficiary may come to “overvalue the action that was unfairly
restricted” and rebel against her deceased parent’s wishes.204
Another potential problem with incentive trusts is that, by using
money as a motivating factor, they may make beneficiaries more material-
istic. Social psychologists use the term “hedonic treadmill” to refer to the
fact that it is difficult to remain “happy for very long if what motivates us
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is getting more.”205 Incentive trusts may lead to a cycle of unhappiness by
encouraging the beneficiaries to concentrate on money as a principal goal.
Overall, the psychological literature does not suggest that incentive
trusts will be a particularly effective motivational tool. It is important to
consider, however, that not all individuals are intrinsically motivated to
work hard or expand their intellectual horizons. If a beneficiary is not
intrinsically motivated, then the use of money as an extrinsic motivator
could have a beneficial effect. The hedonic-treadmill effect would also be
less threatening if the beneficiary were unlikely to do anything productive
without the external motivator. Thus, much depends on the individuals
who would be the beneficiaries of an incentive trust. A valid argument
exists for allowing a settlor to use his own judgment in deciding whether
an incentive trust will be effective for his children.
V. MODIFICATION ALTERNATIVES
Assuming that situations exist in which it is desirable to allow a
settlor to create an incentive trust, the question may be raised regarding
how much power a court should have to modify or terminate such a trust
when it proves to be inflexible. As a threshold matter, it is necessary to
consider whether there should be special rules applicable only to incentive
trusts. If not, then some changes to the general rules regarding trust
modification may be in order to accommodate the difficulties posed by
incentive trusts.
To the extent that incentive trusts involve some tension between the
settlor’s goals and the preferences of the beneficiaries, a case can be made
for applying different modification rules for incentive trusts as compared
with other types of trusts. Current trust modification rules appear to be
based on an assumption that the settlor generally would support modifica-
tions that benefit the beneficiaries. In an incentive trust, however, a
deceased settlor might have had a very different opinion than the benefi-
ciaries, or even the court, regarding what is in the beneficiaries’ best
interest. One could argue, therefore, that the beneficiaries should have to
meet a higher standard to demonstrate that modifications are necessary
when the trust in question is an incentive trust.
If different modification rules are necessary for incentive trusts, the
problem arises of how to distinguish between incentive or other-types of
trusts. A trust that distributes money when a beneficiary gets married
might be an incentive trust, or the settlor merely might want to help the
beneficiary cover the expense of a wedding. The same might be said of a
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trust that distributes money when the beneficiary has a bar or bat mitzvah:
such a trust could be an incentive trust intended to encourage religion, or
it could be an effort to ensure that a predictable milestone is celebrated
with an appropriately lavish party. If separate rules are written for the
modification of incentive trusts, a workable definition of “incentive trust”
is necessary.
Apart from the problem of definition, it is not clear that a separate
statutory scheme needs to be created for incentive trusts. Rather than
provide mandatory rules that apply only to incentive trusts, the law could
allow individual settlors to set the parameters for modification and to
decide how much court involvement is necessary. This would give the
settlor, rather than the court, the ultimate power to decide how flexible or
inflexible the trust should be. One alternative, for example, would be to
enact the balancing test of the Third Restatement, but make it default law,
stating explicitly that the settlor can override it in the trust instrument.206 
Making the Third Restatement rules default law might be justified on
the theory that giving absolute control to the settlor encourages work and
savings. The productivity-incentive justification for dead hand control,
however, rests on a shaky foundation when applied to incentive trusts.
Moreover, while the father-knows-best hypothesis suggests that the settlor
might be in a better position than a court to decide whether incentives are
appropriate, it is difficult to say that a settlor will be so prescient as to
anticipate all the circumstances that might warrant modification. There is
a strong case for making the balancing test mandatory law. 
Allowing a court to balance the settlor’s purposes against the reasons
for modification or termination, however, is not without its drawbacks.
The first drawback comes into play when the settlor chooses an individual
with significant knowledge of the settlor’s family as trustee. To the extent
the settlor has some insight into the needs of her children, that insight
might be reflected in the settlor’s choice of trustee. By choosing a trustee,
the settlor identifies an individual or entity whose judgment the settlor
deems reliable. If an individual trustee is chosen, the trustee may have a
considerable knowledge of the settlor’s family and the settlor’s children.
The same is true if a corporate trustee is advised by a committee of indi-
viduals or an individual trust protector.207 In such circumstances, the
individual or individuals the settlor selects might be in a better position
than the court to decide how the needs of the beneficiaries should be
balanced against the reasons for modification or termination.
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In the event that the settlor chooses a corporate trustee and does not
select a family advisory committee or trust protector, court-ordered modi-
fication raises a second problem. A corporate trustee may not care
whether an incentive trust is modified by a court in the interest of the
beneficiaries. Once the settlor has died, a corporate trustee may not be
sufficiently motivated to oppose modification if the proposed modifica-
tion has no impact on the trustee’s fees or the cost of administering the
trust.208 (Termination, on the other hand, will obviously be a greater
concern for a corporate trustee.) While corporate trustees may not defer
blindly to the beneficiaries’ wishes, a judicial modification proceeding
brought by the beneficiaries may prove to be pro forma if the trustee is a
corporation and the modification would not affect the corporation’s
bottom line. In such a case, the court might not benefit from any advocacy
on behalf of the settlor’s point of view.
To solve these problems, a legislature enacting the Third Restatement
balancing test might take one of two approaches. To address the first
issue, the legislature could provide by statute that, if the terms of the trust
so direct, the trustee must consent to any proposed modification that
would contradict the settlor’s purposes. If the trustee refuses consent, and
the trustee’s consent is required in the trust, the proposed modification
will not go forward. This would give veto power to the trustee over any
proposed modification and would enable the settlor to choose the individ-
ual or entity who will have the final say over any proposed modification.
Another possibility, directed at the second problem, would give a
corporate trustee an incentive to make the case against modification at any
judicial proceeding. A statute could provide that, if a court modifies a
trust contrary to the settlor’s purposes, and the terms of the trust so direct,
the court must remove the trustee and appoint a new trustee to administer
the modified trust. Such a provision would make the trustee’s continued
administration of the trust contingent upon the trustee successfully de-
fending the settlor’s wishes. This would turn the modification proceeding
into an adversarial proceeding, with real debate between the trustee and
the beneficiaries.
If enacted together, these two proposals might make it too difficult for
the court to apply the balancing test. Corporate trustees might prove
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unwilling to consent to modification if doing so meant losing the adminis-
tration of the trust. A legislature could solve this problem by specifying
that the trustee’s consent is required only if the trustee is an individual,
and that the trustee will be removed only if it is a corporate trustee. This
would prevent the two provisions from operating together to preclude
modification.
Because the father-knows-best justification carries less weight after
the beneficiaries known to the settlor have died, a legislature might limit
the application of these provisions to circumstances in which at least some
beneficiaries known to the settlor are still living. Once the beneficiaries
known to the settlor have all died, a court freely could apply the balancing
test as proposed by the Third Restatement. This policy would be in line
with a suggestion recently made by Schanzenbach and Sitkoff that modi-
fication and termination be made easier after the perpetuities period
expires.209
These alternatives take into account a fundamental characteristic of an
incentive trust—the settlor’s wishes may be at odds with the beneficia-
ries’ desires. The alternatives give the settlor some flexibility in making
sure that his wishes at least are given a fair hearing. They do not, how-
ever, prevent the trust from being modified when the settlor’s purposes
have proven to be inflexible.
The alternatives suggested here may be criticized. Requiring the
consent of an individual trustee makes modification more difficult, and
there may be circumstances in which an individual trustee unreasonably
will withhold consent. On the other hand, forced removal of a corporate
trustee may not serve the interests of the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries
might be forced to give up a trustee they prefer in order to have the trust
modified.  Transferring administration of a trust may be costly and time-
consuming, and the trust will have to pay the costs.
It is important to point out, however, that these proposals would only
come into play if the settlor specified in the trust instrument that she
wished them to be applied. If the terms of the trust were silent, the court
could modify the trust without seeking the consent of an individual trustee
and without removing a corporate trustee. The default would be free
modification, and any deviation would be at the instance of the settlor.
FALL 2006 Incentive Trusts and the Inflexibility Problem   495
Settlors who prefer the Third Restatement regime could simply choose not
to address the matter in the trust.
To effect these reforms, a court might adopt a modified version of the
Third Restatement provision that reads as follows:
(1) Subject to Subsection (2), if all of the beneficiaries of an
irrevocable trust consent, they can compel the termination or
modification of the trust.
(2) If termination or modification of the trust under Subsection
(1) would be inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust,
the beneficiaries cannot compel its termination or modifica-
tion except with the consent of the settlor or, after the
settlor’s death, with authorization of the court if it determines
that the reason(s) for termination or modification outweigh
the material purpose and the requirements of Subsections (3)
and (4) are satisfied.
(3) If one or more beneficiaries known to the settlor is alive at
the time a modification is proposed, one or more natural
persons are serving as trustee, and the terms of the trust so
direct, the court shall not modify a trust pursuant to Subsec-
tion (2) unless the natural person or persons serving as trustee
consent to the proposed modification.
(4) If, after the death of the settlor, a court determines that a trust
should be modified pursuant to Subsection (2), one or more
corporations are serving as trustee, one or more beneficiaries
known to the settlor are alive, and the terms of the trust so
direct, the court shall remove that corporation or corporations
and appoint a new corporation or corporations to serve as
trustee.
This proposed statute may lack the virtue of simplicity, but it ensures
that someone will speak up in favor of the settlor’s original plan when a
modification is proposed. If the settlor selected an individual trustee, that
individual must consent to the modification if that was the settlor’s wish;
otherwise the trust will not be modified. If the settlor selected a corporate
trustee, the settlor may direct the replacement of that trustee in the event
of a court-ordered modification. Both provisions are limited to circum-
stances in which one or more beneficiaries known to the settlor are still
alive at the time a modification is proposed. Modification against the
settlor’s wishes is still possible, but the settlor may choose a person to
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approve the modification or may ensure that there will be a real debate in
the event a corporate trustee is chosen.
The proposal outlined here may be difficult to enact because banking
lobbies are likely to oppose a provision that would remove a corporate
trustee in the event of modification. It is important to point out, however,
that corporate trustees as a class will not suffer from this proposal because
the removal of one corporate trustee will result in the appointment of a
new corporate trustee. The proposal requiring the consent of an individual
trustee when the settlor so directs should be less controversial. States that
have shied away from adopting the provisions of the Third Restatement
out of a fear of losing trust business might be more inclined to follow this
relatively pro-settlor model. In any event, future law reform proposals
should take into consideration the possible tension between the intent of
the settlor and the wishes of the beneficiaries presented by incentive
trusts.
VI. CONCLUSION
Incentive trusts may or may not be the wave of the future. If incentive
trusts catch on, however, they are likely to present difficulties for trust
law that must be addressed. Ground rules must be set now so that poten-
tial settlors considering incentive trusts will know how likely it is that a
court will modify the trust against their intentions. Because the problem
of inflexibility can already be anticipated, legislatures should not wait
until specific difficulties arise to choose the best legal regime.
Some argue that if children have not been raised properly during the
life of their parents, conditions imposed from beyond the grave are not
likely to help much. Every family’s circumstance is different, however,
and there may be cases in which an incentive trust is preferable to an
outright bequest. What the law must decide is whether the settlor’s origi-
nal decision should bind future generations, and if not, who should be
given the power to reevaluate that decision. If the beneficiaries alone are
given a voice, that voice assuredly will speak against conditional love. 
